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ARTICLES
THE UNEXPECTED VALUE OF LITIGATION:
A REAL OPTIONS PERSPECTIVE
Joseph A. Grundfest* and Peter H. Huang**
In this Article, we suggest that litigation can be analyzed as though it is a
competitive research and development project. Developing this analogy, we
present a two-stage real option model of the litigation process that involves
sequential information revelation and bargaining over the surplus generated by
early settlement. Litigants are risk-neutral and have no private information. The
model generates results that, we believe, have analytic and normative
significance for the economic analysis of litigation.
From an analytic perspective, we demonstrate that negative expected value
(NEV) lawsuits are analogous to out of the money call options held by plaintiffs
and that every NEV lawsuit is credible if the variance of the information revealed
during the course of the litigation is sufficiently large. This finding helps explain
the prevalence of a class of lawsuits that has proved puzzling to traditional,
* W.A. Franke Professor of Law and Business and Director of the Rock Center on
Corporate Governance, Stanford Law School; Commissioner, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (1985-1990).
** Member, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, and Harold E.
Kohn Chair Professor of Law, James E. Beasley School of Law, Temple University; J.D.,
Stanford Law School; Ph.D., Harvard University; A.B., Princeton University.
The authors thank the following institutions for their support: the Institute for Advanced
Study, School of Social Science; the James E. Beasley School of Law, Temple University;
and the George R. Roberts Program in Law, Business, and Corporate Governance at
Stanford Law School. Thanks also to Anita Allen-Castellito, Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Bone,
Andy Daughety, Allan Erbsen, Claire Finkelstein, Susan Franck, Gillian Hadfield, Louis
Kaplow, Leo Katz, Michael Knoll, Paul Mahoney, Mitch Polinsky, Bob Rasmusen, Jennifer
Reinganum, Kathy Spier, Steven Shavell, Cathie Struve, Alan Sykes, Alex Triantis, George
Triantis, Ho-Mou Wu, and members of audiences from the John M. Olin Conference on Real
Options and the Law at the University of Virginia Law School; and workshops at Harvard
Law School; the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University;
Marquette University Law School; the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced
Study; the University of Minnesota Law School; and the University of Southern California
for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Mr. ChenLi Wang, a member of Stanford University's class of 2006, constructed this
Article's online calculator and graphing tool, available at http://lawreview.stanford.edu/real-
options. We are most grateful for his creativity, diligence, and assistance.
1267
STANFORD LA W RE VIEW
expected value-based modes of litigation analysis. The model also suggests that
risk-neutral defendants can act as though they are risk-averse and that risk-
neutral plaintiffs can act as though they are risk-seeking because increases in
variance can increase a lawsuit's settlement option value just as it increases a
call option's value without regard to the holder's degree of risk aversion. Models
that presume defendants' relative risk aversion may therefore rely on an
unnecessary assumption. Our model also suggests that a lawsuit's option
settlement value is not a monotonically increasing function of the variance of the
information revealed during the litigation. In particular, at low levels of variance
a lawsuit's option settlement value may equal its traditional expected value, but
as variance increases its option settlement value can display a discontinuity after
which its option settlement value becomes a monotonically increasing function of
variance. NEV lawsuits can also display "dead zones "--regions of variance over
which the claim is not credible even though it is credible over higher or lower
levels of variance. Comparative statics analysis also quantifies the extent to
which a lawsuit's settlement value increases as plaintiff's litigation expenses
occur later in the litigation process, as the ratio of defendant-to-plaintiff litigation
expense increases and as plaintiff bargainingpower increases.
From a normative perspective, we offer an "impossibility conjecture"
suggesting that the mere presence of an irreducible degree of uncertainty
endemic to the litigation process can be sufficient to prevent private litigation
incentives from equating to socially optimal incentives, even if one adopts all
other assumptions necessary to equate private and social incentives. It follows
that it may be impossible to articulate normative principles of law through
substantive standards that ignore the uncertainty inherent in the litigation
process and the procedural environment in which the litigation occurs.
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INTRODUCTION
Lawsuits and investment projects have much in common.1 Indeed, every
lawsuit forces litigants to make current expenditures in order to influence future
outcomes. That is the essence of investment. Lawsuits bear a particularly strong
resemblance to commercial research and development projects because both
involve the discovery of new information in an environment in which managers
can adjust their strategies in response to those disclosures. We therefore suggest
that, by modeling lawsuits as investments in competitive research and
development projects, it is possible to generate valuable insights about the
operation of the litigation process that are difficult or impossible to derive
through the application of more traditional modeling techniques.
Commercial research and development projects involve uncertainty about
whether they can be completed on budget and on schedule and about the
profits, if any, that will be generated if the project succeeds. Researchers
modify their strategies while they conduct their projects, and they increase,
decrease, accelerate, defer, or terminate expenditures in response to new
information. Because firms often race to introduce products that target similar
markets, complex competitive interactions can arise as each firm's strategies
1. By "investment projects" we refer to "real" investment projects, such as the decision
to develop a new oil field, to pursue the development of a new pharmaceutical, or to write
new software code. These decisions are distinguished from financial investment decisions,
such as the decision to purchase or sell a financial instrument in the form of stocks, bonds,
options, futures, or forwards. This distinction is common in the real option literature, which
often draws analogies to and conclusions from the theory of financial call options. See, e.g.,
Steven R. Grenadier, An Introduction to Option Exercise Games, in GAME CHOICES: THE
INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY XV (Steven R. Grenadier ed., 2000)
("Essentially, the real options approach posits that the opportunity to invest in a project is
analogous to an American call option on the investment opportunity. Once that analogy is
made, the vast and rigorous machinery of financial options theory is at the disposal of real
investment analysis."); LENOs TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS: MANAGERIAL FLEXIBILITY AND
STRATEGY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION xi (1996) (describing real options as relating to "the
classical subject of resource allocation or project appraisal under uncertainty, particularly
with the valuation of managerial operating flexibility and strategic interactions").
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and expenditures influence its competitor's strategies and expenditures. The
ability to respond to new information in a strategic manner is therefore central
to the research and development process. In addition, new information may
indicate that the firm should terminate its project early, which incurs shutdown
costs and thereby benefits competitors who continue with their own research
and development efforts.
Lawsuits can be described in essentially identical terms. They involve
uncertainty about the facts underlying the plaintiffs claim and about the
interpretation of the law to be applied to those facts. There is also uncertainty
about the damages, if any, that will be awarded if the plaintiffs claim prevails.
Litigants modify their strategies during the lawsuit and increase, decrease,
accelerate, defer, or terminate litigation expenditures in response to new
information. Defendants may make settlement payments to plaintiffs in order to
terminate a lawsuit. Thus, just as a shutdown decision imposes costs on the
exiting firm and generates benefits for its competitors, a settlement imposes
costs on the defendant and benefits the plaintiff.
2
Litigation also raises complex competitive interactions because each
litigant's strategies and expenditures can influence an opponent's strategies and
expenditures. The ability to respond to new information in a strategic manner is
evidently central to the litigation process. Put another way, litigants and their
lawyers are not "potted plants" who adopt a strategy at a lawsuit's inception
and then watch passively as new information spills out and opponents alter
their tactics.
3
From an investment perspective, lawsuits are therefore largely
indistinguishable from research and development projects, and it follows that
the tools applied to the economic analysis of research and development projects
might also be profitably applied to the economic analysis of litigation. The
2. Novartis's decision to halt development of a new cholesterol drug illustrates this
phenomenon. The decision cost Novartis hundreds of millions of dollars and benefited other
pharmaceutical firms who continued to develop competing cholesterol treatments. See
Novartis Ends Development of Cholesterol-Lowering Drug NKSI04, DRUG INDUSTRY
DAILY, Dec. 19, 2005, available at http://www.fdanews.com/did/4_246/deals/49754- 1.html.
There are, no doubt, differences between the decision to settle a lawsuit and the decision to
shut down a research and development project. In particular, the settlement decision
generally involves a symmetry that is lacking in the shutdown decision: the payment by the
defendant to the plaintiff defines a zero-sum process whereas the decision to abandon a
research project confers benefits on competitors that can be larger or smaller than the firm's
shutdown costs. The symmetric nature of the payments in lawsuit settlements helps simplify
certain aspects of the model presented in this Article. See infra Part II.B.
3. The observation that lawyers are not "potted plants" is attributed to Oliver North's
counsel, Brendan V. Sullivan, who, upon being instructed to remain silent during the course
of his client's congressional testimony, replied, "I'm not a potted plant. I'm here as a lawyer.
That's my job." Joint Hearings Before S. Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran
and the Nicaraguan Opposition and H. Select Comm. To Investigate Covert Arms
Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong. 100-7 Pt. I, 263 (1987) (testimony of Oliver L. North);
see also Iran-Contra Hearings: Note of Braggadocio Resounds at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July
10, 1987, at A7 (responding to this interchange).
1270 [Vol. 58:1267
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literature, however, reveals a rather remarkable gap between the two fields of
study. Over the last two decades or so, real options analysis has emerged as the
state-of-the-art technique for the economic analysis of research and
development and has generated insights that are difficult or impossible to
obtain through the application of more traditional discounted cash flow or net
present value techniques. 4 Real options analysis has, however, had very little
influence on the economic analysis of litigation.
5
This Article seeks to narrow that gap. We present a real options model of
litigation in which parties bargain over the allocation of litigation expenditures
that are avoided when a case settles early. Ours is not the first real options
model of litigation,6 but it is the first to incorporate bargaining behavior and the
first to generate closed form solutions that define a lawsuit's settlement value
with precision. 7 Our model's bargaining component also differentiates it from
standard real options models that typically involve a single decisionmaker
seeking to optimize value over exogenously determined states of nature. 8 Our
model is not, however, a "complete" model of litigation because it assumes that
the parties' litigation expenditures are exogenously determined. 9
Thus, at one level, this Article constitutes a straightforward intellectual
arbitrage in which we transplant insights that are well understood by students of
real options theory from the world of investment analysis to the world of
4. For specific examples of real options theory applied to research and development
activity, see TOM COPELAND & VLADIMIR ANTIKAROV, REAL OPTIONS: A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE 322-37 (2001); TRIGEORGIS, supra note 1, at 341-47; Martha Amram, The Challenge
of Valuing Patents and Early-Stage Technologies, 17 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 68 (2005); Nancy
A. Nichols, Scientific Management at Merck: An Interview with CFO Judy Lewent, HARV.
BUS. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 89; Ralph Villiger & Boris Bogdan, Valuing Pharma R&D:
The Catch-22 of DCF, 17 J. APPL. CORP. FN., 113 (2005); Ram Willner, Valuing Start-up
Venture Growth Options, in REAL OPTIONS IN CAPITAL INVESTMENT 221 (Lenos Trigeorgis
ed., 1995). See also infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 23-25, 70-73 and accompanying text.
6. The distinction of being the first to apply real options analysis to litigation is
generally credited to Bradford Cornell, The Incentive To Sue: An Options-Pricing Approach,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990).
7. Cornell explains that the goal of his article "is not to provide precise estimates of the
value of litigation options, but to offer general insights into how such options affect the
incentive to sue." Id at 176. In contrast, our objective is to provide precise estimates of
equilibrium settlement values, to conduct a set of comparative statics analyses, and to offer
more general insights about the implications of real options theory for the study of litigation.
8. "In standard real options models, investment (exercise) strategies are formulated in
isolation, without regard to the potential impact of other firms' exercise strategies."
Grenadier, supra note 1, at xv. More recent real options models explore the implications of
strategic market interactions. For a collection of some of these works, see GAME CHOICES:
THE INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY (Steven R. Grenadier, ed., 2000).
9. In the context of a real options model of litigation, a complete model would also
contain a game-theoretic component that describes how each litigant's strategy responds to
changes in opposing litigants' strategies. Total litigation expenditures would then not be
exogenously determined. For a discussion of these and other potential extensions to the
model presented in this Article, see infra Part V.C.
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litigation analysis where those insights are not as broadly appreciated. This
arbitrage is of more than narrow, technical interest because it generates novel
insights that are difficult or impossible to derive through more traditional
modes of analysis. Moreover, these insights have significant analytic and
normative implications for the economic analysis of litigation. The rather
simple model presented in this Article also suggests that more complex
applications of real options theory offer a particularly promising paradigm for
further study of litigation behavior.
In Part I, we expand on the suggestion that litigation can be reframed as a
real option, summarize our model, and outline the analytic and normative
implications of our findings. Part II offers a simple example of real options
analysis as applied to a research and development project, formally defines our
model, and describes our model in the context of prior literature. Part III
provides several intuitions regarding the model's equilibrium concept and
offers examples of how to generate equilibrium solutions. This Part also
introduces an online calculator and graphics tool that allows readers to solve for
our model's equilibrium real option settlement values for any set of parameters
input. Part IV summarizes a series of formal propositions about the model's
equilibrium properties. (Proofs for these propositions are presented in the
Appendix.) Part V expands on our model's analytic and normative implications
and describes potential extensions.
I. REFRAMING THE ECONOMIC DESCRIPTION OF LITIGATION
A. Real Options, Investments, and Litigation
The most common economic model applied to both investment and
litigation decisions involves expected value analysis based upon a discount
factor that reflects the risk inherent in the project or lawsuit. 10 In these models,
an investment project's expected value is described as the probability of its
success multiplied by the likely payoff in the event of success. The effects of
risk or uncertainty I are reflected through changes in the relevant discount rate,
10. This approach is also often described as the net present value (NPV) approach, and
is characterized in the real options literature of investments as the "orthodox theory" of
decisionmaking. See, e.g., COPELAND & ANTIKAROV, supra note 4, at 56 ("Net present value
is the single most widely used tool for large investments made by corporations.");
TRIGEORGIS, supra note 1. For an application of NPV analysis to litigation, see ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 393-97, 410 (4th ed. 2004). See also sources
citcd infra note 70. We recognize that some articles adopt far more sophisticated analyses of
the litigation process than the basic NPV model without expressing a real options
perspective. We address that literature in Part II.
11. Analyses often draw a distinction between risk and uncertainty: risk "consists of
future states in which the outcomes, though unknown, follow a known distribution, while
uncertainty consists of those states for which the distributions are also unknown." Larry T.
Garvin, Disproportionality and the Law of Consequential Damages, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 339,
365 n.141 (citing FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233-34 (1921)). For
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or cost of capital, with riskier projects bearing a higher discount rate or capital
cost and therefore having a lower discounted expected value. 12 These models
are commonly described as discounted cash flow (DCF) or net present value
(NPV) models. 13 When NPV analysis is applied to litigation, the lawsuit's
expected value is typically described as the probability that the plaintiff will
prevail multiplied by the likely award. 14 The effects of risk or uncertainty are
again expressed through changes in the relevant discount rate, with riskier
lawsuits bearing a higher discount rate and therefore having a lower expected
value. 
15
In the investment world, this expected value analysis has recently been
supplemented by a "real options" approach that has "had a huge impact on
academic research."' 16 The interest in real options theory arises, in part, because
"traditional discounted cash flow (DCF) approaches to the appraisal of capital-
investment projects, such as the standard net-present-value (NPV) rule, cannot
properly capture management's flexibility to adapt.., to unexpected market
developments." 17 Real options analysis solves this problem by integrating the
investment manager's ability to adapt to new information into the model itself.
While the traditional DCF and NPV approaches assume a fixed commitment to
full investment at the outset, real option theory models the investment process
as a series of decision points at which investors have the option of adjusting
purposes of this analysis, however, we do not distinguish between the concepts of risk and
uncertainty and use the terms interchangeably.
12. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 16-18
(8th ed. 2006) (describing how appropriate discount rate must reflect risk and opportunity
cost of capital); TRIGEORGIS, supra note 1, at 38-40. Alternatively, the same result can be
reached through the application of the "certainty equivalent" approach in which each
period's uncertain cash flow "is replaced by. .. the certain cash flow in year t that has the
same present value as the uncertain cash flow in that year." TRIGEORGIS, supra note 1, at 34.
13. Id. at 1. DCF analysis describes a process in which "[f]uture cash flows [are]
multiplied by discount factors to obtain [a] present value." NPV analysis describes a
"project's net contribution to wealth-present value minus initial investment." BREALEY ET
AL., supra note 12, at 996, 1000. Both procedures lead to identical decision rules.
14. For sample applications of this formula, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 136 (3d ed. 2003); Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren
F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the Preliminary Injunction
Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REv. 381, 386-87 (2005).
15. Models of litigation often assume that litigants are risk-neutral and therefore do not
consider variance as an explicit parameter of the model. In these risk-neutral models, the
only information that can change the lawsuit's equilibrium settlement value is information
that changes the expected mean of the lawsuit's outcomes. However, if a model allows for
learning, then changes in the variance of outcomes can have dramatic consequences for a
lawsuit's equilibrium settlement value even when litigants are risk-neutral and the new
information does not affect the lawsuit's mean value. See infra Parts III, IV.
16. Alexander Triantis, Realizing the Potential of Real Options: Does Theory Meet
Practice?, 17 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 8, 8 (2005).
17. TRIGEORGIS, supra note 1, at 1; see also Nalin Kulatilaka & Alan J. Marcus,
Project Valuation Under Uncertainty: When Does DCF Fail?, 5 J. APPL. CORP. FIN. 92
(1992).
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their investments in response to new information. 18 This perspective supports
the insight that investment "[p]rojects that can easily be modified ... are more
valuable than those that do not provide such flexibility. The more uncertain the
outlook, the more valuable this flexibility becomes.
' l
Because of these advantages, the real options approach has "influenced
research in virtually every business discipline[,] ... promoting better
understanding of the role of uncertainty on investment activity in various
sectors of our economy."20 Nearly 1000 articles apply real option theory to
various forms of investment activity, 2 1 and leading finance texts now
commonly incorporate the real options perspective. 22 In contrast, while there is
a small but growing literature that seeks to apply options theory to various
areas of the law,23 very few articles apply real options analysis to the study of
18. TRIGEORGIS, supra note 1, at 1 ("Traditional DCF approaches make implicit
assumptions concerning an 'expected scenario' of cash flows and presume management's
passive commitment to a certain static 'operating strategy' (e.g., to initiate a capital project
immediately, and to operate it continuously at base scale until the end of its prespecified
expected useful life)."). For an example of how the real options approach differs from
traditional DCF or NPV analyses, see infra Part II.A.
19. BREALEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 258; see also AVINASH K. DIXIT & ROBERT S.
PINDYCK, INVESTMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 6-25 (1994) (explaining the value in examining
real investments as options); TRIGEORGIS, supra note 1, at 1-4, 9-20, 121-50 (same). See
generally EDUARDO S. SCHWARTZ & LENOs TRIGEORGIS, REAL OPTIONS AND INVESTMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: CLASSICAL READINGS AND RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS (2001); 38 Q.
REv. ECON. & FIN. 615 (1998) (Special Issue) (providing a collection of articles applying
real options analysis to managerial issues).
20. Triantis, supra note 16, at 8.
21. Id.
22. "The subject of real options now typically comprises an entire chapter in corporate
finance textbooks." Grenadier, supra note 1, at xv.
23. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS
(2005) (illuminating legal rights by applying options analysis); Douglas G. Baird & Edward
R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 356 (2001) (analyzing
decisions by firms to shutdown as real options); Oren Bar-Gill, Pricing Legal Options: A
Behavioral Perspective, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 203 (2005), available at
http://www.bepress.com/rle/voll/iss2/art2 (explaining that legal rules can be interpreted as
creating options and presenting a model analyzing the value of these options under optimism
and overconfidence); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1401
(2005) (proposing court-awarded option entitlements as an alternative to traditional liability
or property rules); Michael S. Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 61,
63 (2002) (illustrating how options theory can help circumvent legal rules); Paul G.
Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1995)
(examining choice between money damages and specific performance by drawing upon
options valuation theory); Marie Obidzinski & Bruno Deffains, Real Options Theory for Law
Makers, (Bureau d'economie theorique et appliquee (BETA), Document de travail No. 04,
2006), available at http://cournot2.u-strasbg.fr/users/beta/publications/2006/2006-04.pdf
(applying real options analysis to lawmaking); Franco Paresi et al., The Value of Waiting in
Lawmaking, 18 EURO. J.L. & ECON. 131 (2004) (analyzing optimal timing of legal
intervention based upon real options analysis); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis,
Embedded Options and the Case Against Compensation in Contract Law, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1428 (2004) (characterizing termination rights as embedded options allocating risk).
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litigation.24 In addition, the leading texts on the economic analysis of law make
little or no mention of real options analysis.
25
This Article seeks to narrow that gap by presenting a real options model of
litigation in which parties bargain over the allocation of litigation expenditures
that are avoided when a case settles early. As previously observed, ours is not
the first real options model of litigation, 26 but it is the first to incorporate
bargaining behavior and the first to generate closed-form solutions that define a
lawsuit's settlement value with precision.
B. Summary of Our Model
The litigants in our model are identical, risk-neutral, individually rational
agents who share common knowledge about all of a lawsuit's characteristics,
including its expected value, the type and value of information that might be
disclosed during the litigation, the variance of the value of that information, and
each party's litigation costs. 27 The litigants also have equal bargaining power
and face equal litigation expenditures. 28 The claim's terminal expected value is
defined as the expected value of the verdict in the event the plaintiff
successfully establishes liability. The litigation proceeds in two stages. At the
end of the first stage, the parties learn new information about the facts of the
case or about the law to be applied to those facts. The plaintiff, having already
incurred the costs of prosecuting the claim through the first stage, evaluates the
newly disclosed information and then decides either to proceed with the claim,
thereby incurring second-stage litigation costs and forcing the defendant to
incur those costs as well, or to abandon the claim, thereby saving second-stage
litigation expenditures for himself and his opponent. The litigants can settle the
case at any point in time. If they settle, they also bargain over the allocation of
the litigation costs avoided through the early settlement.
The traditional expected value mode of analysis suggests that this case will
See generally John M. Olin Conference on Real Options and the Law, University of Virginia
Law School, Oct. 1-2, 2004, http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/academics/olin/
olin conference04.htm.
24. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 10 (giving no application of real options
analysis to litigation); THOMAS J. MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW: TORTS, CONTRACTS,
PROPERTY, LITIGATION 156-200 (1997) (same) [hereinafter MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE
LAW]; THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 243-64 (2004) (same)
[hereinafter MICELI, ECONOMIC APPROACH]; POLINSKY, supra note 14 (same); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003) (same); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004) (same).
26. See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 6.
27. For a complete description of the model, see infra Part ll.B.
28. The assumptions of equal bargaining power and equal litigation expenditures are
relaxed later in the analysis as we perform a series of comparative statics exercises. See infra
Part IV.C.
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settle for its discounted expected value. 29 Further, because the litigants are risk-
neutral, changes in the variance of the value of the information disclosed during
the course of the litigation will not affect the lawsuit's settlement value unless
those changes also affect the lawsuit's expected value.
In stark contrast, a real options analysis of precisely the same lawsuit
paints a far more intriguing picture of the litigation process and suggests that
litigants will rationally settle for amounts that can be far higher or lower than
the claim's expected value even if that expected value is held constant. The
extent to which the lawsuit's real option settlement value diverges from its
expected value depends, in material part, on the variance of the information to
be disclosed, even though the parties are risk-neutral and even though we
constrain all changes in the variance of the disclosed information to preserve
the lawsuit's expected value.30 In the real options framework, variance is a
critical determinant of a lawsuit's settlement value because the larger the
variance, the more dramatic and potentially valuable the information waiting to
be disclosed during the course of the lawsuit and the larger the value of the
plaintiff's option to continue or to abandon the litigation in response to that
information. Put another way, a lawsuit's variance can be important because it
reflects the value of the ability to adjust to newly learned information
independently of the litigants' attitudes toward risk.
C. Analytic Implications of a Real Options Approach to Litigation
From an analytic perspective, this rather simple real options model solves
several "mysteries" that have vexed students of litigation and generates new
insights that have not previously been appreciated in the literature. For
example, negative expected value (NEV) lawsuits are defined as lawsuits "in
which the plaintiff would obtain a negative expected return from pursuing his
suit all the way to trial, that is, one in which the plaintiffs expected litigation
costs would exceed the expected judgment." 3' The literature views these
29. "It is clear that if the plaintiff and the defendant have the same beliefs about the
trial outcome, then there should always exist mutually beneficial settlements, because they
can each escape trial costs by settling." SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 402. Under our
assumptions, the mutually beneficial settlement would be for the lawsuit's expected value
because each party avoids precisely the same amount of litigation expenditures and each is
equally powerful in settlement negotiations. See infra Part III.A.
30. We achieve this result by assuming that the underlying probability distributions are
drawn from a family of distributions that display mean-preserving spreads. See infra note 63.
The assumption of a mean-preserving spread can be abandoned in more complex models.
See infra Part V.C. We also demonstrate that settlement values, and the very credibility of
the underlying lawsuit, can depend on the sequence in which litigation expenses are
incurred, differences in the parties' relative bargaining power, and a litigant's ability to
impose disproportionate litigation expenses on an opponent. See infra Appendix,
Propositions 11-13.
31. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of
Threats To Sue, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1996).
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lawsuits as "puzzling" and asks, "Why would a defendant be willing to pay a
positive amount in settlement to a plaintiff who would not actually go through
with the trial?"'32 While several articles offer a range of explanations for the
existence of NEV litigation,33 real option theory offers a simpler rationale: a
NEV lawsuit is merely an out-of-the-money call option that a plaintiff will
rationally pursue as long as the cost of acquiring the option is less than the
option's value. 34 Therefore, just as it makes sense for an investor to purchase a
call option to buy a share of stock for $100 even though its current price is
$90-provided that the option's price is low enough and its volatility (meaning
the chance of some surprising good news coming to the market before the
option expires) is high enough-it makes sense for a plaintiff to pursue a risky
claim with a negative expected value if the cost of pursuing the claim is low
enough and the possibility of uncovering some sort of smoking gun that will
lead to a recovery higher than the claim's expected value is large enough. NEV
lawsuits can therefore reflect perfectly rational assessments about the
implications of the learning, abandonment, and other real options embedded in
the litigation process. Indeed, we formally demonstrate that every NEV lawsuit
can become credible if the variance of the information to be disclosed during
the litigation is sufficiently high.35
The real options perspective also suggests that risk-neutral defendants can
act as though they are risk-averse and that risk-neutral plaintiffs can act as
though they are risk-seeking for reasons that have nothing to do with risk
aversion. 36 Instead, in a large category of cases, increasing uncertainty over the
32. SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 420.
33. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 31 (suggesting divisibility of litigation expenses as a
potential explanation for NEV litigation); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely To Extract a
Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437 (1988) (suggesting imperfect information as a cause
of negative expected value litigation); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the
Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3, 4 (1990) (proposing a model that
explains NEV suits as an "asymmetric information game"); David Rosenberg & Steven
Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 3 (1985) (proposing a model where the ordering of the parties' expenses leads to
settlement in NEV suits); see also SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 420-23 (offering a summary
of this literature).
34. A call option is an option to buy an underlying asset, while a put option is an
option to sell an underlying asset. A call option is "out of the money" when the price of the
underlying instrument is less than the option's strike price. The fact that the option is out of
the money
does not mean that the right to buy the asset.., has no value. In fact, from a client's point of
view, [the price of the underlying asset] may move up during the interval [over which the
option can be exercised] and end up exceeding [the strike price by the time of the option's
expiration].
SALIH N. NEFTCI, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 199 (2004).
35. See infra Appendix, Proposition 3.
36. Cornell, supra note 6, at 179, contains a similar observation, but does not suggest
that there are discontinuities in the relationship between a lawsuit's settlement value and its




outcome of the litigation causes the plaintiffs claim to become more
valuable. 37 The defendant will therefore rationally pay more to settle the case
for reasons that have nothing to do with risk aversion and everything to do with
the value of the plaintiffs option to adjust litigation expenditures in response to
new information. Thus, to the extent that the literature on the economic analysis
of litigation introduces assumptions regarding the parties' relative risk aversion,
those assumptions may not be necessary to derive those models' results.
38
Our model also suggests that litigation settlement values can behave quite
differently from option values commonly derived in financial markets. A
financial option's value is generally a monotonically increasing function of the
variance of the underlying instrument.39 In contrast, the model presented in this
Article suggests that, because of sudden changes in a lawsuit's credibility,
settlement values can be discontinuous, nonmonotonic functions of a lawsuit's
underlying variance. 40 In particular, when variance is sufficiently low, a
lawsuit can have a settlement value that initially equals its expected value, but
as variance increases, the lawsuit's settlement value can suddenly drop in a
discontinuous manner, and then, as variance continues to increase, settlements
can continue to climb to valuations far higher than the lawsuit's ex ante
expected value. 4 1 The model also suggests that some NEV lawsuits can be
subject to "dead zones"-regions of variance over which the lawsuit suddenly
loses and then regains credibility. 42 The presence of discontinuities and dead
zones suggests that small differences in expectations as to a lawsuit's variance
can cause significant differences in a lawsuit's settlement value, even when the
litigants agree about the lawsuit's expected value.
37. See, e.g., infra Appendix, Proposition 10.
38. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 10, at 410 (discussing explanations of
litigation based upon risk aversion or loss aversion); POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 139;
POSNER, supra note 25, at 569. For examples of analyses based upon attitudes towards risk to
explain observed litigation, see Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in
3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442 (Peter Newman ed.,
1998); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:
An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107 (1994); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains,
Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113 (1996) (relying on the
psychology of choice and prospect theory to suggest that defendants will adopt risk-seeking
strategies and that plaintiffs will adopt risk-averse strategies); David Rosenberg, Mass Tort
Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 393
(2000); Richard S. Markovits, Tort Related Costs and the Hand Formula for Negligence
(Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 036, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=649724; James B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure (Feb. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-300959.
39. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 630 (7th ed. 2005); PETER
G. ZHANG, EXOTIC OPTIONS 77 (2d ed. 1998) ("[O]ption writers normally charge more for
options with higher volatility, other things being equal. Therefore, vegas [the measure of
how fast an option price changes with its volatility] of all options are always positive.").
40. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2-3, IV, Appendix.
41. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2-3, IV, Appendix.
42. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2-3, IV, Appendix.
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These discontinuities have a straightforward analogue in the real world of
litigation. Consider a case in which the plaintiffs claim hinges critically on the
testimony of a single witness or on the outcome of a key judicial ruling.
Immediately after the witness testifies or after the ruling issues, the value of the
plaintiffs claim will either be sharply higher or lower than the expected value
of the claim just prior to the resolution of the uncertainty. The plaintiffs
willingness to pursue the lawsuit will also rationally change in response to the
new information. If the information is favorable to the plaintiff, then he will be
willing to pay more to continue to pursue the claim; conversely, if the
information is unfavorable, he will be willing to pay much less. The act of
revealing new information can thereby cause a discontinuity in settlement
value, as the information can cause the price of settlement to increase or
decrease, sometimes rather sharply. Moreover, as we later demonstrate, if we
modify our model slightly to allow for differential expectations, small
differences in expectations as to the variance of the information to be disclosed
(even when the litigants agree as to the claim's expected value) can be
sufficient to cause the parties to expend material sums on litigation costs just to
settle the case after some uncertainty is resolved but prior to judgment.43 This
pattern replicates the one most often observed in actual litigation: a complaint
is filed, litigation expenses are incurred, and lawsuits are settled after some
uncertainty is resolved but prior to final judgment.
44
Our model further suggests that a lawsuit's settlement value can depend
critically on the sequence in which the litigants incur expenses, even if the total
value of each party's litigation expenditures is held constant and the sequence
of expenditures is identical for both litigants.45 For example, if a plaintiff is
able to defer a larger fraction of his litigation expenditures until a sufficient
degree of uncertainty has been resolved, then the value of a plaintiffs claim
will increase.46 The intuition behind this result is that a plaintiff can commit to
a relatively small investment before learning most of the information about a
lawsuit's value. A card game that requires a smaller ante before a player sees
the cards he is dealt is, all other factors equal, worth more than the same
gamble with a higher required buy-in. The same phenomenon holds true in
litigation. We also demonstrate that changes in the parties' relative bargaining
power and in their relative litigation costs can have dramatic and
disproportionate effects on a lawsuit's equilibrium settlement value.
47
43. See infra Appendix, Proposition 14 and subsequent discussion.
44. See, e.g., Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REv.
2073, 2107-09 (2002) (collecting empirical studies finding that the percentage of civil cases
that result in a verdict has declined over time and is currently hovering around three percent).
"Studies repeatedly show that the overwhelming majority of disputes end without trials." Id.
at 1207.
45. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2-3, IV, Appendix.
46. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2-3, IV, Appendix.
47. See discussion infra Parts III.C.2-3, IV, Appendix.
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Our model's ability to generate comparative statics results that describe,
with precision, the implications of changes in the sequence and magnitude of
litigation costs, in the uncertainty involved in a lawsuit, and in the parties'
relative bargaining power, suggests that the model is additionally useful as a
means of analyzing the effects of procedure qua procedure. More specifically,
procedural rules can be described in terms of their effects on the timing and
magnitude of the parties' litigation costs and on the uncertainty of the litigation
process. Because the real options framework can be adjusted to incorporate
several simultaneous variations to each of these parameters, it provides a robust
model for the analysis of procedural reform of the litigation process.
The model also readily describes the "trade-off' between changes in
procedural rules that might make lawsuits harder or easier for plaintiffs to
prosecute and changes in substantive standards that might make lawsuits more
or less valuable to plaintiffs if they prevail. Substantive standards are generally
defined as rules of law that govern the existence of liability and the remedies
imposed in the event liability is established.48 Procedural rules are generally
defined as governing the process of pleading, proof, discovery, and all other
matters related to the environment in which the litigants argue as to whether the
substantive standards have been satisfied.
D. Normative Implications of a Real Options Approach to Litigation
These observations suggest that the real options perspective also has
normative implications for the economic analysis of litigation. Substantive
rules of law generally define a lawsuit's expected value, i.e., the circumstances
under which liability will be found and the magnitude of the damages to be
awarded contingent on that liability. A lawsuit's expected value in our model
equals its terminal value and captures the economic implications of applicable
substantive standards. From a real options perspective, the difference between a
lawsuit's terminal or expected value and its option value, therefore, describes
the economic value of process, learning, and uncertainty. If the settlement
option value exceeds the terminal value, then the procedural environment
combined with the uncertainty inherent in the litigation process is pro-plaintiff
relative to the governing substantive rule of law. However, if the terminal value
exceeds the settlement option value, then the procedural environment combined
with the uncertainty inherent in the litigation process is pro-defendant relative
to the governing substantive rule of law.
48. Polinsky adopts an essentially identical distinction between substantive and
procedural rules. POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 141-45. Examples of substantive standards
include the rules of tort liability and breach of contract, together with the rules that establish
damage measures for torts and contract breaches. Examples of procedural rules include the
rules of evidence and of civil and criminal procedure, together with principles of substantive
and personal jurisdiction, and all other matters on which the courts rely to determine how to
apply substantive rules of law.
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Normative principles that seek to generate socially optimal levels of
compensation and deterrence through the litigation process, such as the Hand
Formula, are generally expressed as substantive rules. 49 Those substantive
rules, and propositions regarding their optimality, are usually derived without
regard either to the litigation's procedural environment or to the ambigity or
vagueness embedded in the substantive standards themselves. The
assumption implied by this mode of analysis is that the procedural environment
and uncertainty in the definition or application of the substantive standard itself
will not, on average and over time, cause actual awards or settlement amounts
to diverge from the lawsuit's expected value because litigation would then lead
to a systematically biased, socially suboptimal result, even in a risk-neutral
world.
It is well understood, however, that private incentives to litigate can
diverge from socially optimal incentives in either direction and that a wide
range of factors can contribute to these divergences. 5 1 A real options
perspective suggests another, perhaps more fundamental and pervasive cause
for this divergence. Even if one constructs an expected value model in which
the private and social incentives to litigate are identical, and in which litigants
are risk-neutral, equally powerful, and symmetrically informed, a real options
analysis demonstrates that the simple presence of uncertainty can be sufficient
to cause a divergence between private and socially optimal incentives to
litigate. 52 It follows that that the assumptions necessary to equate private and
social incentives to litigate may be far stronger than previously recognized and
may include the requirement that uncertainty is sufficiently low even if litigants
49. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 10, at 333-37; POSNER, supra note 25, at
167-71.
50. See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 10, at 333-37; POSNER, supra note 25, at
167-71. Ambiguity describes "situations in which an expression can be understood in more
than one distinct sense (e.g., river bank versus savings bank), while [vagueness] refers to
problems of borderline cases (e.g., a piece of ceramic that is not clearly a bowl or a cup, but
something in between)." Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and
Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 859, 860 (2004). Although linguists and philosophers tend to
be precise in drawing distinctions between the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness, the
legal literature tends to conflate all forms of indeterminacy under either label without regard
to formal distinctions between the two. Because either source of uncertainty is sufficient to
drive the model's results, we follow the legal literature and do not here distinguish between
the formal notions of ambiguity and vagueness.
51. SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 391; accord A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Economic Analysis of Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Lawrence
Blume & Steven Durlauf eds., 2d ed. forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 22, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=859406 (last visited Mar. 15, 2006)) (citing Steven Shavell, The
Social Versus the Private Incentive To Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL
STUD. 333 (1982); Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and
the Social Motive To Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997)). For a catalogue
and discussion of these causes of divergence, see SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 391-401, 411-
15. See also infra notes 130-131 and accompanying text.
52. See infra Part V.C for further discussion of this point.
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are risk-neutral. Because uncertainty is, however, prevalent in the litigation
process, it is far from clear that it could ever be reduced to the degree necessary
to equate social and private incentives to litigate in a real options model.
53
These observations suggest an "impossibility conjecture" with potentially
significant implications for normative analyses of the litigation process. If it is
true that uncertainty cannot be reduced to a degree sufficient to equate the
private and social incentives to litigate (by causing lawsuits' option settlement
values to equal their expected or terminal values), then the real options
perspective suggests that no number of other heroic assumptions about the
efficiency or fairness of the private litigation process will be sufficient to
equate private and social incentives to litigate. Put another way, even in a risk-
neutral world, uncertainty alone can be sufficient to throw a monkey wrench
into the proposition that private litigation can systematically be relied upon to
achieve optimal social objectives.
This "impossibility conjecture" calls into question the common assumption
that it is possible to craft substantive rules of law that can reach socially
optimal results without attention to the procedural environment in which those
rules will be litigated, the ambiguities inherent in the rules' articulation, and the
unavoidable uncertainties of the litigation process. 54 If this perspective is
correct, then substance cannot be separated from procedure in pursuit of
socially optimal rules of law. This observation suggests that the pragmatic
pursuit of socially optimal rules of law could benefit from more generalized
models that integrate the rules of legal procedure with the definition of
substantive legal standards and the uncertainty generated by each.55 Real
option theory provides just such a modeling tool and for that reason has the
potential to make valuable contributions to the normative analysis of the
litigation process in addition to its more technical, analytic contributions.
II. A REAL OPTIONS MODEL OF LITIGATION THAT INCORPORATES BARGAINING
Real options analysis (ROA) provides a powerful set of modeling tools that
can be applied to describe and value the potential benefits of decisionmaking
53. For a discussion of various sources of uncertainty in the litigation process,
including institutional factors that could make it difficult if not impossible to reduce
uncertainty to a sufficient degree, see infra notes 132-140 and accompanying text.
54. This observation is hardly novel from the perspective of traditional legal realists
who emphasize a host of nonsubstantive factors as essential in determining the outcome of
the litigation process. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Legal Process, Legal Realism, and the
Strategic Political Effects of Procedural Rules 2 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 06, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=837665 ("Realists argue
that the apparently neutral procedural requirements are created or applied precisely for their
ideological implications.").
55. A similar observation is found in Polinsky, but without reference to the divergence
between private and social incentives that can be caused by the simple presence of
uncertainty. POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 144-45.
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flexibility when managing a project. First, ROA provides a discipline that
induces management to define various forms of optionality that can be inherent
in an investment opportunity. This objective is typically achieved through the
construction of decision trees that articulate the sequence in which a project
will proceed and the nature of the uncertainty and management flexibility that
arises at each step of this process. 56 Second, ROA offers a family of techniques
for quantifying the often subjective uncertainty that arises in the pursuit of
investment projects and lawsuits alike. 57 Third, ROA offers techniques for
combining these observations to generate a single "option value" for a project
that takes into account the project's inherent uncertainty and flexibility.
58
Although many of these techniques can be quite complicated and can require a
high degree of mathematical sophistication, the basic principles of ROA are
easily described by way of illustration and require no mathematical
sophistication beyond the ability to add and subtract.
We begin by discussing a simple example of ROA as applied to a research
and development project. This example, presented in Part II.A, illustrates a
situation in which the value of management flexibility leads ROA to
conclusions that differ dramatically from those generated by more traditional
NPV and DCF analyses. The ability to model and value management flexibility
in response to new information distinguishes ROA from more traditional
models of the litigation process and serves as the basis for the formal model we
present in Part II.B. We discuss prior literature in Part II.C, where we draw
particular emphasis to the earlier models of Bebchuk and Cornell, each of
which constitutes a special case of the more general model described in this
Article.
A. An Example of Real Options Analysis Applied to a Research and
Development Project
To illustrate the difference between ROA and more traditional DCF and
NPV analyses, consider a hypothetical venture in which a pharmaceutical
company has an opportunity to develop a drug that requires an outlay of $3
million today to support a research and development project that has only a
10% chance of success. If the research succeeds, the company will have to
56. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 257-66; Tom Copeland & Peter
Tufano, A Real-World Way To Manage Real Options, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar. 2004, at 90,
94-95. The earliest example of which we are aware that applies rigorous decision tree
analysis to litigation strategy is in Mark B. Victor, The Proper Use of Decision Analysis To
Assist Litigation Strategy, 40 Bus. LAW. 617 (1985). See also id. at 617 n.1 (citing to earlier
applications of decision tree analysis dating back to 1981). Victor's analysis clearly
anticipates the application of real option theory to litigation analysis but falls short of
expressing a real option approach because it fails to recognize or to value any form of
optionality inherent in the decision tree structure it presents for litigation decisionmaking.
57. See, e.g., Copeland & Tufano, supra note 56, at 94.
58. Id. at 95-96.
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invest an additional $80 million (discounted to present value) to build the
manufacturing facilities necessary to bring the drug to market. This research
project will also allow this manufacturer to determine whether the drug can be
sold over-the-counter (OTC) or whether it must be sold with a prescription. If
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves this drug for OTC sales, it
will generate net cash flow with a discounted present value of $160 million; if
the FDA approves this drug for prescription sales only, however, it will
generate net cash flow with a discounted present value of $40 million. The
company estimates that these two outcomes are equally probable. Thus, if the
research project is successful, the discounted present value of its net cash flow
is $100 million (a 50% probability of $160 million in returns plus a 50%
probability of $40 million in returns).
If the company applies traditional DCF or NPV modeling techniques, it
calculates that the project has a 10% chance of generating a net income stream
worth $20 million ($100 million representing the expected value of net
revenues, less $80 million in launch costs) and would value that opportunity at
$2 million (10% of $20 million). However, because the initial outlay would
cost $3 million, traditional DCF and NPV analyses would suggest that the
project has a net negative value of $1 million and should not be pursued.
ROA, in contrast, reaches precisely the opposite conclusion because it
recognizes management's ability to abandon the project if it learns that the
FDA will approve the drug for prescription sales only. In particular, if the
research indicates that the FDA will approve the drug for prescription sales
only, then the company will make no further investment because investing $80
million to build a manufacturing plant for a return of $40 million is not
profitable. The project would then be abandoned with a downside equal to a
sunk cost of $3 million. However, if the research indicates that the FDA would
approve OTC sales, then the company would rationally invest an additional $80
million in manufacturing facilities to produce the drug that would generate a
positive cash flow of $160 million, for a positive return of $80 million.
Thus, as of the end of its research and development phase, the company
recognizes that if the project is successful in the sense of producing an
approvable drug, there is a 50% chance that the project will simply be
abandoned with no additional cost and a 50% chance that the project will
generate $80 million. The value of this 'project viewed from the conclusion of
its research and development phase is therefore $40 million, but only if we
assume that research has already been successfully completed. The probability
of success is, however, only 10%, so the expected value of those returns must
be discounted to $4 million (10% of $40 million). Because the cost of
conducting the research necessary to generate that $4 million income stream is
only $3 million, ROA would urge that the company undertake the project.
ROA reaches a conclusion contrary to the traditional DCF and NPV
analyses because it expressly models and values management's option to
abandon the project if the results of the research phase indicate that the drug
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will not generate revenues sufficient to cover its costs. Traditional NPV and
DCF approaches suppress the value of this optionality because they calculate
the project's expected value based on an implied assumption that management
retains no such flexibility. 59 Indeed, as uncertainty over potential revenues
increases, management's option to abandon becomes more valuable, and the
divergence between the results of ROA and NPV grows.
To illustrate, we can increase the variance of the drug's expected value
after FDA acceptance so that FDA review will reveal that the drug is either
worthless or that it will generate net cash flow of $200 million, each with equal
probability. Because the drug still has an average value of $100 million in
sales, by the logic described above, the traditional NPV or DCF approaches
would again urge that the project not be pursued. In sharp contrast, however,
the ROA approach would find that the project is now even more valuable
because there is a 10% chance that the project will lead to a 50% probability of
a payoff of $120 million ($200 million in returns less the $80 million necessary
to build the manufacturing facility). That return is worth $6 million ($6 million
= 10% * 50% * $120 million), a 50% increase over the $4 million return
observed at the lower level of uncertainty. Thus, as uncertainty increases, the
value of management flexibility can also increase, and the difference between a
real options perspective and the traditional DCF and NPV perspectives
becomes all the more significant.
B. The Formal Definition of Our Model
Our model builds upon this real investment example by formalizing it into
a model of the litigation process and by adding the feature that the litigants can
bargain over the allocation of the surplus generated by the decision to settle a
lawsuit early. When Stage 1 starts, a plaintiff must spend a fixed amount Cpl to
initiate the lawsuit and a defendant is initially forced to spend CdI to defend the
lawsuit. 60 Additional information concerning the litigation is revealed to both
parties at the end of Stage 1. After that information is revealed, the plaintiff has
an option either to abandon the litigation, 6 1 thereby avoiding the expenditure of
the next stage's fixed litigation costs of Co2, or to continue through Stage 2 in
order to collect a judgment. If the plaintiff decides to continue through into
Stage 2, then he incurs fixed costs of Cp2 and the defendant is forced spend a
59. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 12, at 257-66.
60. We assume that this defendant is forced to incur this expenditure because if he fails
to do so he will incur a default judgment whose consequences to him are more severe than
spending Stage 1 litigation costs.
61. We recognize that a plaintiffs ability to dismiss an action voluntarily at no cost
may depend on the stage of the lawsuit and on a variety of additional factors. See generally
Michael E. Solimine & Amy E. Lippert, Deregulating Voluntary Dismissals, 36 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 367, 376-78, app. (2003). We assume costless abandonment solely to simplify
the analysis.
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fixed amount C,2 in defense. 62 The court announces its verdict at the end of
Stage 2. Before that, both parties can settle the lawsuit at any point without
incurring additional costs.
We assume the litigants share common expectations regarding the initial
expected value of the court's judgment awarded to the plaintiff if the lawsuit is
pursued to its conclusion. We denote this value by g. Uncertainty regarding
information revealed during the litigation is described by a binary random
variable X that assumes a value we denote by A with probability p, and a value
we denote by B with probability (1 - p). We assume the initial expected value
of p is fixed. This assumption means that p, A, and B must satisfy this initial
condition: pA + (1 - p)B = g. In other words, the information revealed at the
end of Stage 1 is constrained to have an initial expected value of jt. The pair of
possible outcomes, A and B, describes a family of probability distributions that
differ by mean-preserving spreads. 63 For ease of exposition, and without any
loss of generality, we assume that A > B.
Moreover, because p is a probability that is fixed in value between zero and
one, the variance of any member of this family of probability distributions is
uniquely defined by either A or B.64 It also follows that if pA increases, then (1
- p)B must simultaneously decrease in order to maintain the mean-preserving
condition: pA + (1 - p)B = g. Further, because the litigants share common
expectations regarding the variance of the uncertainty they face, they must
agree on the potential values of A and B.65
62. Again, if a defendant fails to incur this expense, he will incur a default judgment
whose consequences to him are more severe than spending Stage 2 litigation costs.
63. Imprecisely speaking, probability distribution A is a mean-preserving spread of
probability distribution B if A is obtained by a mean-preserving increase in risk from B. For
precise discussions of mean-preserving spreads, see, for example, Josef Hadar & William R.
Russell, Rules for Ordering Uncertain Prospects, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 25 (1969); Michael
Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Increasing Risk: I. A Definition, 2 J. ECON. THEORY 225,
227-29 (1970); Michael Rothschild & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Increasing Risk: II. Its Economic
Consequences, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 66 (1971). See also Eric Rasmusen, When Does Extra
Risk Strictly Increase an Option's Value? (Nov. 17, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/optionsrasmusen.pdf (revisiting the notion of
mean-preserving spreads and introducing related notions of riskier distributions).
64. See infra Appendix, Proposition 9.
65. The interpretation of the model becomes significantly more complex when B has a
negative value, implying that the plaintiff must make a payment to the defendant in the
amount of B. Such a payment could come as the result of a counterclaim brought by the
defendant. This interpretation does not, however, fit comfortably with our assumption of
costless abandonment because a rational defendant would not abandon a valuable
counterclaim. We are grateful to Allan Erbsen and Michael Knoll for related observations.
Alternatively, negative values for B can be modeled as a form of a costly abandonment
option where the additional cost of abandonment is paid to defendant. This interpretation of
the model is, however, a special case of the more general problem posed by costly
abandonment, which we address in future extensions of this model. See infra Part V.C.
Another way to interpret a negative value for B within the costless abandonment
framework would be to view the payment as a court-ordered sanction that plaintiff would be
required to pay to the defendant if the plaintiff continued to litigate the matter into Stage 2.
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We denote the litigants' relative bargaining power by a parameter a, which
defines the fraction of the surplus generated by a settlement that a plaintiff
captures. We initially assume that the litigants' bargaining power is fixed and
equal, so that (X = 0.5. We later relax this assumption.
66
The litigants share common knowledge about litigation costs, j., p, A (or
equivalently, B), x, and about each litigant being risk-neutral and individually
rational, in the sense that each behaves so as to maximize its expected wealth.
Our model can be viewed as describing a relatively simple lawsuit in which
risk-neutral litigants confront only a single uncertain variable. That variable
can, for example, describe third-party witness testimony that is equally
unknown to the plaintiff and to the defendant. Although the content of that
third-party testimony might be unknown, the parties concur as to the
testimony's implications for the expected value and variance of the ultimate
judgment. Alternatively, the uncertainty can describe a particular court's choice
between two potential interpretations of a statute to be applied to a set of
stipulated facts. The litigants share common expectations as to the likelihood
that the court will select one interpretation of the law over another and as to the
implication of each choice for the ultimate judgment.
But in order to present the court with an opportunity to resolve this
uncertainty, each party must first incur Stage 1 litigation costs. These costs are,
for example, discovery expenses if uncertainty is fact driven or legal research
and briefing costs if uncertainty derives from a pure question of law. After the
uncertainty is resolved, the plaintiff has an option to continue to pursue the case
in order to collect a judgment that both parties, viewing the litigation as of its
inception, agree has an initial expected value of g. However, in order to cause
payment of the judgment, the plaintiff must spend an additional Cp2 either for
additional briefing on questions of law or for further factual development of the
record. If the plaintiff decides to continue with the lawsuit, the defendant is
forced to incur costs of Cd2. Alternatively, if the plaintiff views the revealed
information as being sufficiently unfavorable, he can abandon the lawsuit at no
However, if the magnitude of that sanction is constrained to reflect the additional litigation
costs that would arise only beyond the point of information disclosure, as is suggested by the
current structure of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, then the magnitude of the negative
value of B would be constrained not to exceed Cd2. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 3d § 1336.3 (2004).
The interpretive difficulties associated with negative values of B are an unavoidable
byproduct of our assumption of a binary distribution with a mean-preserving spread. Given
the constraints of such a distribution, the only possible means of generating a sufficiently
large variance is, on occasion, by assuming a negative value of B. If, however, we assume
different forms of probability distributions that are truncated to have no negative values,
such as the lognormal, then none of these interpretive issues arise and the qualitative results
of our model remain unchanged. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu,
A Continuous Real Options Litigation Bargaining Model (Jan. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the authors) (generalizing this model to lognormal probability
distributions for which negative values are not possible).
66. See infra Appendix, Proposition 13.
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additional cost.
67
Our model can thus be described as containing a compound real option
68
consisting of a learning option and a continuation or abandonment option.69 A
plaintiff can exercise a learning option by filing a lawsuit and deciding to invest
a premium of CpI in order to learn the information that is disclosed at the end of
Stage 1. A continuation option arises after that information is revealed, because
the plaintiff has an option to continue this litigation by investing a further Cp2.
The options generated by litigation, however, differ from standard financial
market call options. When a plaintiff files a lawsuit, the plaintiff acquires a call
option whose terminal value is defined by the lawsuit's judgment upon its
conclusion. Legal fees and other costs constitute premiums that a plaintiff must
pay to third parties, such as lawyers and experts, and not to a defendant, in
order to optimize that lawsuit's value. A defendant is forced to write a
plaintiffs call option and becomes contingently liable for a judgment that
might be rendered at the lawsuit's conclusion. However, instead of receiving a
premium in consideration of bearing this risk, a defendant must also pay
litigation costs to lawyers and to other third parties in an effort to minimize the
total value of the plaintiffs claim.
This is not to suggest that a defendant receives no compensation for writing
a plaintiffs call option. If a defendant appreciates that his activities-whether
in the form of selling a pharmaceutical, driving a car, or offering a security for
sale-give rise to the risk of litigation, then he could rationally include a
"litigation premium" in the price of the goods sold or action taken. So applied,
our real option pricing model could in principle serve as a method for
calculating the value of that litigation premium.
However, even if a defendant does charge such a premium, a distinction
remains between the operation of litigation and financial call options. In
particular, a financial option defines a zero-sum process in the sense that an
67. See Solimine & Lippert, supra note 61. We are aware that, as a descriptive matter,
plaintiffs rarely abandon litigation midstream unless there is a judicial ruling, such as the
grant of a motion to dismiss with prejudice or of summary judgment. A plaintiff's decision
not to appeal such an adverse ruling, or to refile the action, if possible, would then be
tantamount to abandonment of the claim. Thus, the model can be interpreted more narrowly
so that the information disclosed at the beginning of Stage 2 is precisely the sort of
information that is in fact correlated with dismissal by court order with no subsequent effort
to reinstitute the claim. Alternatively, as suggested to us by Paul Mahoney, Stage 1 can be
viewed as prelitigation investigation and Stage 2 as the conduct of the lawsuit itself after the
complaint has been filed.
68. Compound options provide the "possibility of stopping mid-stream... [where]
each stage completed (or dollar invested) gives the firm an option to complete the next stage
(or invest the next dollar)." DIXtT & PINDYCK, supra note 19, at 320.
69. For a description of various forms of real options, including continuation and
abandonment options and staged investment options that provide parties with the opportunity
to invest specifically in order to gain additional information, see, for example, HAN T.J. SMIT
& LENOs TRIGEORGIS, STRATEGIC INVESTMENT: REAL OPTIONS AND GAMES 108-09 tbl.3.1
(2004); TRIGEORGIS, supra note 1, at 2-3.
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option holder's gain (loss) must equal that option writer's loss (gain), taking
into account both the premiums that are paid for the option and the option's
terminal value. In contrast, litigation options are sure to be zero-sum only in the
terminal value of the judgment that the defendant might be required to pay to
the plaintiff. Litigation is not zero-sum in the aggregate because the premiums
paid by each party are not paid to each other and because each party must bear
its own litigation expenses with no requirement that these expenses offset each
other in any meaningful sense.
C. Related Literature
The literature on the economic analysis of litigation is voluminous,7 ° but it
has previously failed to integrate, in a single model, litigants' opportunities for
learning, adaptation, and strategic interaction. Several articles consider
elements of optionality in litigation, 7i and some apply options perspectives to
litigation. 72 A small number of articles apply formal options analysis tolitigation. 73 All these articles, however, differ from ours in terms of issues they
70. The traditional, early citations to the literature include: John P. Gould, The
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, An
Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399
(1973). More recently, several books contain excellent reviews of the literature. See, e.g.,
ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 20-40, 71-96
(2003) (presenting the basic model of litigation and settlement); COOTER & ULEN, supra note
10, at 388-426 (same); MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW, supra note 25, at 157-80 (same);
MICELI, ECONOMIC APPROACH, supra note 25, at 243-64 (same); POLINSKY, supra note 14, at
135-46 (same); POSNER, supra note 25, at 563-609 (same); SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 387-
470 (same).
71. See, e.g., C. Frederick Beckner, III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and
Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 41 (1999) (presenting a multistage decision model of
sequential legal procedure, which solves for the optimal standards of summary disposition
that minimize the sum of information and error costs and the optimal sequence of legal and
factual issues that a court should take up); William M. Landes, Sequential Versus Unitary
Trials: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 99 (1993) (addressing when a court should
hold separate trials for liability versus damages as opposed to just one unified trial that
considers both issues); Warren F. Schwartz, Severance-A Means of Minimizing the Role of
Burden and Expense in Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1197
(1967) (discussing the policy considerations of severing certain issues in litigation).
72. See, e.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass
Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747, 755-58 (2002); Guy Halfteck, The Class Action
as a Financial Call Option (Harvard Univ. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 466, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=528043.
73. See, e.g., William J. Blanton, Reducing the Value of Plaintiffs Litigation Option in
Federal Court: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 2 GEO. MASON L. REV. 159,
160 (1995) (evaluating the consequences of changes in evidentiary rules on plaintiffs'
incentives to file lawsuits); Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly
Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47 (2004) (offering a real options analysis of
litigation abandonment options that is related to our analysis); Peter H. Huang, A New
Options Theory for Risk Multipliers of Attorney's Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73
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study, their treatment of information revelation, and their analysis of strategic
interactions between litigants.
Of the published works that consider the implications of divisibility or
optionality in litigation, the models presented by Bebchuk 74 and Cornell17 are
the closest antecedents to ours. Bebchuk presents a model in which the plaintiff
has an option to subdivide his litigation expenses into stages. The plaintiff can
abandon the litigation at no cost at the end of each stage and can also bargain
with the defendant over the allocation of litigation costs that can be avoided
through early settlement. Bebchuk demonstrates that mere divisibility of
litigation costs, coupled with costless abandonment and bargaining over
avoided litigation expenditures, can be sufficient to cause some NEV lawsuits
that are noncredible absent divisibility to become credible. Bebchuk's analysis
also indicates that greater divisibility can only bolster a lawsuit's credibility.
76
Bebchuk's analysis, however, does not allow for learning or uncertainty in
the course of litigation and does not provide a contextual reason for the
existence of cost divisibility at any particular point in the litigation process. In
contrast, our model expressly allows for a learning option with a subsequent
abandonment or continuation option as a function of information disclosure at
the point of cost divisibility. Our model is thus naturally interpreted as creating
divisibility with a concomitant abandonment option arising when events induce
information revelation, as occurs with rulings on questions of law or discovery
of third-party information. Bebchuk's pure divisibility model can therefore be
viewed as a special case of our model in which information disclosed during
litigation has no payoff-relevant value because no litigant changes his action in
response to such disclosure.
77
Cornell describes litigation as a real option process that involves
information revelation at discrete stages where a plaintiff has an option to
abandon his claim if it appears that further litigation is unprofitable. 78 Cornell's
analysis is, in many respects, similar to ours in that it "accounts for the
sequential nature of decision making without introducing asymmetric
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1943 (1998) (providing a real options analysis of risk multipliers for
attorneys' fees in public interest litigation); Frederick C. Dunbar et al., Shareholder
Litigation: Deterrent Value, Merits and Litigants' Options 26-30 (John M. Olin Sch. of Bus.,
Washington Univ., Working Paper No. 95-07-a, 1995) (on file with authors) (presenting an
options approach to nuisance suits, plaintiffs' attorneys' behavior under contingent fee
arrangements in securities litigation, securities litigation reform, and testable hypotheses
about observed settlements in shareholder class actions).
74. Bebchuk, supra note 31.
75. Cornell, supra note 6.
76. Bebchuk, supra note 31, at 15.
77. For a formal proof of this observation, see infra Appendix, Proposition 5.
78. Cornell, supra note 6, at 182, explains that "[tihe option pricing approach
highlights the fact that whenever a suit is filed, the defendant is forced to write litigation
options that give the plaintiff the right to pursue the case in promising situations and the right
to drop the case in unfavorable conditions."
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information" 79 and also finds that "the value of litigation options rises as the
uncertainty of the payoff increases," 80 even though litigants are risk-neutral.
Cornell's analysis differs substantially from ours, however, in two distinct
respects. First, Cornell does not recognize the possibility of bargaining over the
allocation of litigation costs that can be avoided by early settlement. Cornell's
analysis is thus limited to a decision-tree approach in which a plaintiff has
options to "prune" the set of outcomes whenever it appears that proceeding will
be unprofitable when viewed solely from the perspective of a plaintiffs own
expected litigation costs. This approach, however, ignores the fact that a
plaintiffs abandonment decision also allows a defendant to avoid litigation
costs and that there is a game-theoretic opportunity for strategic interaction
over the allocation of the surplus generated by those avoided costs. Second,
Cornell's analysis is illustrative, rather than formal. It is expressly designed
"not to provide precise estimates of the value of litigation options, but to offer
general insights into how such options affect the incentive to sue." 81 In
contrast, we provide precise equilibrium estimates of litigation's option
settlement value and also describe how those precise values depend on the
model's variance, the size and temporal incidence of litigation costs, and the
parties' relative bargaining power, among other matters.
Cornell's analysis can therefore be viewed as a special case of our model in
which a defendant either incurs no defense costs, which is an unrealistic
assumption, or makes a credible commitment not to share avoided litigation
costs with a plaintiff as part of a settlement. Under either scenario, a plaintiffs
abandonment decision then generates no avoided defense costs over which
bargaining can take place, and the game-theoretic component of the analysis
drops out of the model.
In summary, Bebchuk's and Cornell's models both involve divisible
litigation costs. Our model includes both Bebchuk's and Cornell's models as
special cases: If we assume that no valuable information is revealed during the
litigation process, then our model is identical to Bebchuk's. If we assume that
there is no bargaining over avoided litigation costs, then our model is identical
to Cornell's. By presenting a model that contains both Bebchuk's and Cornell's
analyses as special cases, we illustrate a link between those works that has not
previously been noted in the literature, 82 and we present a model that is
consistent with the recent trend toward models that integrate game theory into
real options analysis.
83
79. Id. at 174.
80. Id. at 179.
81. Id. at 176.
82. It is valuable to observe that Bebchuk cites neither to Cornell nor to real options
analysis as relevant literature.
83. See generally SMIT & TRIGEORGIS, supra note 69; GAME CHOICES: THE
INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY (Steven R. Grenadier ed., 2000).
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1II. INTUITION AND EXAMPLES
Although the model is relatively simple to describe, its analysis is complex
for two distinct reasons. First, each litigant's optimal strategy depends on the
information disclosed during the lawsuit. Second, the lawsuit's settlement value
requires application of a reasoning process known as backward induction.
However, as is the case in all litigation models with full information and
homogeneous expectations, the parties here settle at the outset rather than incur
any litigation expenses. 84 This result is the litigation equivalent of the "no-
trade" result in financial markets85 that builds upon the no-disagreement result
in game theory as initially developed by Robert Aumann, 2005 Nobel Laureate
in Economics. 86 Our model is, however, easily modified so as to allow small
differences of opinion over the expected variance of the information to cause
the parties to incur Stage 1 litigation costs even though they later settle the
lawsuit prior to trial.87 This pattern is, as we later explain, a more realistic
depiction of observed litigation practice in which litigants most commonly
incur some litigation expense before settling prior to trial.88 As an introduction
to our model, however, we initially address only the situation in which the
litigants have homogeneous expectations and settle the dispute at its inception.
To help develop intuition about the model's equilibrium settlement value
and to establish a foundation for the model's formal solution, we begin with an
example that underscores the importance of learning in the presence of an
abandonment option in the context of a positive expected value (PEV) lawsuit.
This example illustrates the importance of variance in determining a lawsuit's
option settlement value and highlights situations in which the predictions of a
real option valuation model diverge from those of DCF or NPV models, as well
as from the predictions of Bebchuk's model, which considers only divisibility
value in the absence of information revelation. We also use this example to
84. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 25, at 569 ("If the parties agree on the probability
that the plaintiff will win in the event of litigation... the case will be settled because
litigation is more costly than settlement .... In general, then, litigation will occur only if
both parties are optimistic about the outcome of the litigation."). See infra Part V.C for a
discussion of extensions to this model that allow for litigation to begin and lead to midsuit
settlements, as often occur, or cause the lawsuit to proceed through to judgment.
85. See, e.g., Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common
Knowledge, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 17 (1982) (proving a no-trade theorem).
86. See Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing To Disagree, 4 ANNALS STATS. 1236 (1976);
John Allen Paulos, Knowledge Is Power: The Nobel Prize in Economics, the Stock Market
and Subterranean Information Processing, ABCNEws.coM, Dec. 4, 2005; see also DREW
FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 548 (1991) ("The first and best-known result
obtained with the formal definition of common knowledge is Aumann's proof that rational
players cannot 'agree to disagree' about the probability of a given event. The intuition for
this is that if a player knows that his opponents' beliefs are different from his own, he should
revise his beliefs to take the opponents' information into account.").
87. See infra Appendix, Proposition 14.
88. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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introduce an online calculator that automatically computes and graphs a
lawsuit's option settlement value for any parameterization of our model,
thereby eliminating the need for tedious calculations to determine a specific
lawsuit's option settlement value. We then offer a more complex analysis of the
settlement value of negative expected value (NEV) lawsuits with a series of
examples that are constructed to highlight situations in which the real options
perspective generates results that are not otherwise found in the literature. We
refer interested readers to Part IV and to the Appendix for a formal treatment of
the conditions under which these divergences arise.
A. Positive Expected Value Litigation
In a PEV lawsuit, total litigation costs are less than the value of the
expected judgment, or Cp1 + Cp2 < gt. Because we initially assume that the
parties have equal bargaining power, if the plaintiffs minimum demand to
settle a lawsuit is lower than the defendant's maximum offer to resolve the
same dispute, the parties will settle by splitting the difference between the
minimum demand and maximum offer. Therefore, if a lawsuit that is to be
litigated in a single period (i.e., a lawsuit that has no optionality and for which
the traditional DCF or NPV decision rule properly applies) has an expected
judgment of 100 with litigation costs of 70 to be borne by each litigant, then the
plaintiff would be willing to accept any settlement greater than 30 (the expected
judgment of 100 less litigation costs of 70) while the defendant would be
willing to settle for any amount less than 170 (the expected judgment of 100
plus litigation costs of 70). Splitting the difference between the minimum
demand and maximum offer leads the case to settle for 100.
The settlement value of the same lawsuit when viewed in the context of our
two-stage real options model can, however, be dramatically different and
depends critically on the potential values of the information to be revealed (i.e.,
the decision as to whether the court selects A or B). Because the lawsuit is
prosecuted in two stages, the model is solved through a process of backward
induction, "the standard method used by economists for analyzing strategic
interactions in which parties make decisions over several time periods."
89
Backward induction is based on the observation that a party's rational course of
action at any stage of a process should be independent of historical actions that
reflect sunk costs.
90
To illustrate the operation of the real options model with a backward
induction equilibrium process, assume as before that the expected value of the
judgment is 100 and that each party bears total litigation costs of 70, with costs
89. Bebchuk, supra note 31, at 6 n.7 (citing FUDENBERG & TIROLE, supra note 86, at
96-99; DAVID M. KREPs, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 399-402 (1990)).
90. Experimental evidence suggests, however, that the backward induction process
may not be descriptively realistic. See, e.g., THEODORE C. BERGSTROM & JOHN H. MILLER,
EXPERIMENTS WITH ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 374-76, 394-96 (1997).
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divided evenly at 35 per period. Now add the assumption that the information
to be disclosed at the end of the first period is a ruling on a question of law that
has a value of either A=400 or B=-200 and that the probability of each outcome
is 0.5, as previously described. 9 1 Given that there is a 50% probability of a
payoff of 400 and a 50% probability of a payoff of -200, the lawsuit's expected
value remains at 100, and the distribution belongs to family of distributions that
are mean-preserving spreads of each other.
If the court picks A, the plaintiff, when viewing the situation from the
beginning of the second period before Stage 2 litigation costs are incurred, will
gladly pay the additional costs of 35 in order to assure a judgment with an
expected value of 400 and will, at that point, accept any settlement with a value
of at least 400 less Stage 2 litigation costs of 35 (which could be avoided if the
case settles early), or 365. The defendant would then be willing to settle for any
value less than the anticipated judgment of 400 plus the Stage 2 litigation costs
of 35 (which again could be avoided if the case settles early), or 435. Because
of their equal bargaining power, the parties will split the difference between the
minimum demand of 365 and the maximum offer of 435 and will settle at that
stage, conditional on the selection of A, for 400.
If, however, the court picks B, then the plaintiff will abandon the lawsuit
rather than invest 35 only to obtain the adverse result of -200. The selection of
B thus renders the plaintiffs claim noncredible. Because the defendant knows
that the plaintiff will then not pursue the claim, the defendant offers nothing to
settle the action. The lawsuit's settlement value conditional on the selection of
B is therefore 0. The plaintiffs option to abandon the lawsuit contingent on the
selection of B is, however, quite valuable because it allows the plaintiff to
avoid the adverse outcome of -200 as well as the need to spend 35 in pursuit of
that adverse outcome.
Now take a step back to calculate the expected value of the settlement that
would be reached just prior to the revelation of the information as to whether
the court selects A or B. That value is 200, or the expected value of the equally
probable settlements of 400 (contingent on the selection of A) and 0
(contingent on the selection of B). Applying the process of backward induction,
the plaintiff at the beginning of Stage 1 would then have to incur litigation costs
of 35 to reach a settlement with an expected value of 200, and will therefore
accept any amount in excess of 200 less Stage 1 litigation costs of 35, or 165, to
settle the lawsuit at its inception. The defendant analyzes the same situation and
would rationally settle at inception for any amount less than the anticipated
later settlement of 200 plus Stage 1 litigation costs of 35, or 235. Because the
litigants have equal bargaining power they split the difference between 165 and
235 and settle the action at its inception for 200.
That settlement is, however, twice as large as the settlement value
91. For a discussion of some of the implications of the assumption that B assumes a
negative value, see supra note 65.
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predicted by a standard single period expected value analysis of the same
lawsuit. The example therefore illustrates the principle that if the variance of
the information to be disclosed is sufficiently large, then the lawsuit's real
option settlement value can be significantly greater than the settlement value
predicted through traditional single-stage expected value analysis.
However, as explained in greater detail below,92 this example of PEV
litigation settling for an amount greater than its corresponding single-stage
expected value arises only because we have assumed that the variance of the
information disclosed is large enough to cause the value of B to be negative.
Indeed, because of our assumption that the underlying distribution is binomial
and mean preserving, it can be proved that if the value of B is constrained to be
nonnegative then this lawsuit would settle for no more than its equivalent
single-stage expected value of 100. 93 This feature of our model can, however,
be shown to be an artifact of our simplifying assumption that the underlying
probability distribution is binomial. For example, if we assume that the
distribution is lognormal (an assumption that would significantly complicate
our analysis), then negative returns to the plaintiff are not necessary for the
option value of a two-stage PEV settlement to diverge from its equivalent
single-stage expected value. 94 Put another way, the underlying lesson of this
example is that for any given PEV lawsuit, if the variance of the information is
sufficiently large, the lawsuit's real option settlement value will exceed its
single-stage expected settlement value.
If, however, a PEV lawsuit's variance is sufficiently small, then there may
be no difference between its option settlement value and its expected value as
calculated through traditional techniques. To illustrate, consider the option
settlement value of the same lawsuit when A=100 and B=100, i.e., the case in
which the revealed information has no economic value because it will not
change the litigants' behavior. In Stage 2, regardless of whether the court picks
A or B, the parties will settle for 100, splitting the difference between the
plaintiffs minimum demand of 65 and the defendant's maximum offer of 135.
Working backward to the beginning of Stage 1, the plaintiff would again be
willing to spend 35 in Stage 1 litigation costs to reach a Stage 2 settlement of
100, and would therefore accept any amount in excess of 65. The defendant
would likewise be willing to pay any amount less than 135. Splitting the
difference leads to an option settlement value of 100.
This example demonstrates that if variance is sufficiently low, then the
revealed information has no value and a lawsuit's option settlement value can
equal the expected value of the judgment as calculated through traditional DCF
or NPV techniques. This example also illustrates a condition under which a
lawsuit's option settlement value equals its "divisibility value"-the value for
92. See infra Appendix, Proposition 7.
93. See id
94. See Grundfest, Huang & Wu, supra note 65.
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which the lawsuit would settle if the plaintiff simply has the ability to incur
litigation expenses in stages and to abandon the lawsuit at each stage, even if
no new information is revealed at each stage.
At intermediate levels of variance, however, this lawsuit's option
settlement value displays a discontinuity that does not arise in traditional
analysis. Consider, in particular, the behavior of the lawsuit's options
settlement value in the vicinity of A--165 and B=35. Just below that value,
when A=165-s and B=35+E (where e represents an arbitrarily small positive
number), if the court selects A, then the plaintiff will accept offers in excess of
130-E while the defendant will be willing to pay any amount less than 200-s
because each party bears litigation costs of 35. Equal bargaining power would
lead the parties to settle for 165-e. If the court selects B, then the plaintiff will
accept a settlement in excess of s while the defendant will be willing to pay an
amount less than 70+F. Equal bargaining power would lead the parties to settle
for 35+s. Because A and B are equally probable, the litigants would settle for
100 just prior to information revelation (the midpoint between 165-F and
35+F). Working backward to the beginning of Stage 1, the plaintiff would again
be willing to spend 35 in Stage 1 litigation costs to reach a Stage 2 settlement
of 100, and would therefore accept any amount in excess of 65. The defendant
would be willing to pay any amount less than 135. Splitting the difference leads
to an option settlement value of 100.
Thus, as compared with the previous example, even when variance grows
to the point where A=165-s and B=35+s, the lawsuit's option settlement value
remains identical to its settlement value as traditionally calculated under DCF
or NPV models. This result follows because for all values of A ranging from
100 to 165-e, and for all corresponding values of B ranging from 100 to 35+E,
the plaintiff would not change his behavior as a consequence of the information
revealed because the plaintiff would continue to prosecute the action regardless
of whether the court selects A or B, and therefore the information has no
economic value.
The situation, however, differs dramatically as soon as A increases ever so
slightly so that A=165+s and B=35-E. Now, if the court selects A, the plaintiff
will accept a settlement in excess of 130+c, while the defendant will be willing
to pay an amount less that 200+s. Equal bargaining power would lead the
parties to settle the suit for 165+E. If the court selects B, then the plaintiff will
abandon the lawsuit because it makes no sense to spend 35 in pursuit of a
judgment that is expected to be only 35-s. The defendant is aware of this fact
and offers nothing in settlement. The selection of B would therefore cause the
lawsuit to lose credibility. Because A and B are equally probable, the litigants
would settle for 82.5+e/2 (or 50%*(1 65+s)) just prior to information revelation.
Working backward to the beginning of Stage 1, the plaintiff would again
be willing to spend 35 in Stage 1 litigation costs to reach a Stage 2 settlement
of 82.5+s/2, and would therefore accept any amount in excess of 47.5+s/2 (82.5
+s/2-35). The defendant would be willing to pay any amount less than
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117.5+6/2 (82.5+62+35). Splitting the difference leads to an option settlement
value of 82.5+-e/2. Thus, when variance increases to the point where A is just
above 165 and B drops just below 35, the information suddenly becomes
valuable because at that point the plaintiff knows that if the court selects B,
then it makes sense to act on that information and not to pursue the claim into
Stage 2. The expected value of the lawsuit also drops precipitously at that point
because all of the option settlement value that was previously impounded in the
possibility that the court would select B suddenly disappears. The settlement
value impounded in the possibility that the court selects A, however, increases
only slightly at that point and certainly not by an amount large enough to offset
the loss in value caused by the sudden noncredibility of outcome B.
The result is a discontinuity in settlement value at the point where one
outcome of the binomial process suddenly loses credibility. Indeed, the amount
by which the settlement value suddenly declines at the point of discontinuity,
here 17.5, equals half of the defendant's avoided litigation cost of 35. Thus, in a
situation in which the variance of the judgment is constrained to have a mean-
preserving spread and the parties have equal bargaining power, the sudden loss
of credibility contingent on the selection of B implies that the plaintiff suddenly
loses the ability to extract half of the defendant's avoided Stage 2 litigation
costs.
However, as variance continues to grow and A increases beyond 165 while
B declines further below 35, the lawsuit's option settlement value continues
monotonically to increase at the rate of A/2. The intuition behind this result is
also straightforward. At levels of A greater than 165, the lawsuit is never
credible if B is selected. All of the lawsuit's option settlement value arises only
if A is selected. The probability of selecting A is, however, defined to be 0.5,
and it therefore follows that as A increases beyond the point of discontinuity at
A=165, option settlement value will also increase, but only at the rate of $1 for
every $2 increase in A.
B. An Online Calculator and Graphing Tool
The option settlement value of any lawsuit described in our model can be
represented graphically as a function of the lawsuit's underlying variance.
Because of the constraint that the underlying distribution belong to a family of
distributions which are mean-preserving spreads of each other, the
information's variance can be summarized by the value of A.95 Figure 1
illustrates this graphic relationship for the example of PEV litigation just
95. Put another way, once the mean of the expected judgment is defined, the selection
of any value of A also determines the value of B because the average must, by construction,
generate an expected value equal to the judgment's expected value. A simple example
illustrates this point. If a binomial distribution is constrained to have a mean of 100, and if
both outcomes are equally probable, then once the value of one outcome is determined to be
150, the value of the second outcome must be 50.
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Figure 1: PEV Litigation Example
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described and shows that this lawsuit's option settlement value remains fixed at
its expected value of 100 until A approaches 165, at which point the lawsuit's
option settlement value drops suddenly to 82.5+U2 and then continues to
increase linearly at the rate of A/2.
The exercise of calculating a lawsuit's option settlement value in this
model and of depicting it as a function of variance can, however, be quite
repetitive. To facilitate this exercise, we have constructed an online calculator
and graphing tool located at http://lawreview.stanford.edu/real-options. 96 This
online calculator and graphing tool allows the user to input the expected value
of the judgment, the probability that outcome A will occur, the parties' relative
bargaining powers, and the litigants' costs in each stage of the lawsuit-the
variables that are necessary and sufficient to define our model-and then
generates a table that illustrates the lawsuit's option settlement values as a
function of its underlying variance, as well as a graph that depicts that
relationship. The calculator also highlights the points at which discontinuities
in settlement values arise.
96. Mr. ChenLi Wang, a member of Stanford University's class of 2006, constructed
this online calculator and graphing tool. The website contains text explaining the algorithm
used to generate the model's solution values and to plot those values as a function of the
lawsuit's variance.
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C. Negative Expected Value Litigation
As complex as PEV lawsuits can be, NEV lawsuits are even more difficult
to analyze for two reasons: first, they can be noncredible if a lawsuit's variance
is insufficiently large, 97 and second, they can contain "dead zones," which are
intermediate levels of variance over which the lawsuit is not credible even
though it is credible for lower and higher levels of variance.
98
In an NEV lawsuit, total litigation costs exceed the value of the expected
judgment, or, Cpl + Cp2 > gt. Traditional expected value analysis suggests that
these cases will never be instituted because they are not credible: it costs the
plaintiff more to pursue the lawsuit to completion than he expects to recover,
and, because the defendant is aware of that fact, the defendant will offer
nothing to settle. Several authors have, however, suggested that NEV litigation
can indeed arise because of imperfect information, 99 asymmetries in the timing
of litigation costs between the plaintiff and the defendant,100 the plaintiff's
ability to commit to pay his attorney part of the cost of litigation in advance,
10 '
or a lawyer's reputation for pursuing NEV litigation.
10 2
In an important contribution, Bebchuk presents a model in which equally
informed identical litigants settle NEV lawsuits for positive amounts simply
because the lawsuit can be pursued in stages that allow the plaintiff to
subdivide his litigation expenses. 10 3 The settlement values generated in
Bebchuk's analysis describe a lawsuit's pure "divisibility value," i.e., the
amount that the defendant will rationally pay simply because the plaintiff has
the ability to subdivide his expenditures over time. Bebchuk's analysis does
not, however, contemplate the possibility that information is revealed in the
course of the lawsuit, or that the plaintiff's decision to abandon or continue the
litigation is animated by new information. 1
04
To help fix our results within the context of the existing literature and to
help focus on the implications of learning options that arise because of
information revelation, we begin with a recapitulation of Bebchuk's model and
repeat an example offered by Bebchuk to establish a "base case" for the
97. See infra Appendix, Proposition 4.
98. See infra Appendix, Proposition 9.
99. See Bebchuk, supra note 33; Katz, supra note 33.
100. See Rosenberg & Shavell, supra note 33.
101. See David C. Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Scaling the Stonewall: Retaining
Lawyers To Bolster Credibility, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 65 (1996).
102. See Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, A Reputation for Being a Nuisance: Frivolous
Lawsuits and Fee Shifting in a Repeated Play Game, 18 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 147 (1998).
103. See Bebchuk, supra note 31.
104. Bebchuk's model is, as we have already suggested, a special case of the model
presented in this Article. In particular, the pure divisibility values derived by Bebchuk are
identical to the settlement values derived in our model if one assumes that the information
disclosed to litigants has no payoff-relevant value in the sense that it does not cause either
litigant to change its optimal strategy. See infra Appendix, Proposition 5.
March 2006] 1299
STANFORD LA W REVIEW
analysis of NEV litigation. This base case describes a positive equilibrium
value for NEV litigation in the absence of information revelation (i.e., the
lawsuit's pure divisibility value). We then offer two examples of how the
introduction of a learning option that preserves all the stated parameters of
Bebchuk's example causes the NEV lawsuit's real option settlement value to
diverge from its pure divisibility value. The first example illustrates a situation
in which the introduction of an information option leads to a settlement value
that is less than the lawsuit's pure divisibility value. The second example is
more complex, and illustrates the existence of dead zones in some NEV
lawsuits. These examples are of particular interest because they reveal patterns
of settlement value that do not otherwise arise in the literature.
1. Recapitulating Bebchuk's example: The pure divisibility value of NE V
litigation
To recapitulate Bebchuk's example, consider a lawsuit in which "the
expected judgment (the probability of the plaintiff prevailing, times the
magnitude of the judgment that he will get if he prevails) is 100. If the parties
proceed all the way to judgment, each party will incur litigation costs of
140." l105 The expected value of this litigation is -40. Single-stage expected
value analysis suggests that the plaintiff will not file this action and that, if
filed, the defendant will pay nothing to settle the complaint because the lawsuit
does not present a credible threat.
Bebchuk's model divides the litigation into two stages. During each stage
each party must spend 70, for a total of 140. The plaintiff, however, can
abandon the lawsuit at the end of the first stage after having spent 70 without
any obligation to spend the remaining 70 required to pursue the lawsuit's
second stage. Applying backward induction to this two-stage process suggests
that the credibility of the plaintiffs threat should first be assessed as of the
breakpoint between Stages 1 and 2. If the plaintiff does not then abandon the
lawsuit, he can spend 70 in Stage 2 to obtain a payment of 100. The plaintiff
will rationally accept any settlement in excess of 30 at that point. The defendant
will rationally offer no more than 170 to settle the claim at that stage. Again,
because the litigants have equal bargaining power in Bebchuk's model, they
split the difference and settle for 100.
Having determined that the lawsuit would rationally settle at the beginning
of Stage 2 for 100, the plaintiff understands that for the investment of 70 in
Stage 1, he can force the defendant to the beginning of Stage 2 where the
defendant will rationally pay 100 to settle the lawsuit. The plaintiff will
therefore settle at inception for any amount in excess of 30 (accounting for
Stage 1 costs of 70). The defendant similarly realizes that he can be forced to
pay 70 in Stage 1 litigation costs to reach a situation at the beginning of Stage 2
105. Bebchuk, supra note 33, at 5.
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in which he would rationally pay 100 to settle. The defendant will therefore
settle at inception for any amount less than 170. Again, because of equal
bargaining power, the parties split the difference and settle for 100.
This example illustrates that simple divisibility in litigation expenditures,
which can be analogized to the presence of an abandonment option in the
absence of a learning option, can be sufficient to cause NEV lawsuits that are
not credible in a single-stage expected value model to become credible when
viewed as a multistage process. We now introduce information revelation into
this process and demonstrate that an NEV lawsuit's real option settlement value
can differ dramatically from its simple divisibility value precisely because of
the presence of a learning option.
2. An example of a learning option that reduces settlement value
As an initial matter, consider a situation in which the expected value of the
judgment is fixed at 100 and where A=100 and B-100. In this situation, there is
no economically useful information to be revealed in the course of the lawsuit,
and the results of our model would be identical to the results of Bebchuk's
analysis. This simple example demonstrates that Bebchuk's model is a special
case of ours in which the information disclosed has zero variance.
Now assume that, all other parameters of Bebchuk's model remaining
fixed, the information disclosed in the course of the lawsuit is such that A=180
and B=20. These values preserve the lawsuit's mean of 100. Thus, if the court
picks A, the plaintiff will rationally invest an additional 70 to obtain an
outcome of 180 at the end of Stage 2 and will accept any settlement with a
value of at least 110. The defendant will pay any value less than 250.
Conditional on the selection of A, the parties will split the difference and settle
for 180. If, however, the court selects B, then the plaintiff will abandon the
litigation rather than invest 70 to obtain 20. Outcome B, in other words, means
that the plaintiff has no credible threat in Stage 2. The expected value of these
two equally likely outcomes, 180 and 0, is thus 90. Viewed as of Stage 1, the
plaintiff has to pay Stage 1 litigation expenses of 70 to obtain a settlement with
an expected value of 90. The plaintiffs minimum demand at inception is
therefore 20, while the defendant's maximum offer is 160. Equal bargaining
power leads the litigants to split the difference and settle for 90, or 10 less than
the lawsuit's pure divisibility value.
This example again illustrates that introducing a learning option into an
environment where an abandonment option is already present does not
invariably increase a lawsuit's settlement value, particularly if variance is not
sufficiently large. The example also helps establish the intuition that
information can cause a lawsuit to become contingently noncredible-i.e., a
lawsuit will pay off for a plaintiff only if some information pans out in favor of
the plaintiff-and that the existence of such a contingent noncredibility can
reduce the lawsuit's real option settlement value.
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3. An example of a real option with a dead zone
NEV litigation differs from PEV litigation in several respects. As we later
demonstrate, while every PEV lawsuit is credible at every level of variance,
some NEV lawsuits are credible only at levels of variance that are sufficiently
large. 10 6 In addition, some NEV lawsuits exhibit an intriguing pattern in which
they are credible for sufficiently low levels of variance, lose credibility over
intermediate levels of variance, and then regain credibility over sufficiently
high levels of variance. Indeed, once these lawsuits regain credibility in our
model, their option settlement value becomes a continuously increasing
function of the lawsuit's variance. Put another way, NEV lawsuits can exhibit
dead zones over which the plaintiffs claim is not credible. For variances below
the lower bound of this transition phase, we demonstrate that the lawsuit is
credible and has a settlement value equal to its pure divisibility value. For
variances greater than the upper bound of this transition phase, the lawsuit
initially has a real option settlement value less than its pure divisibility value,
but its real option settlement value then continues to increase as variance
increases and can far exceed the pure divisibility value.
In particular, we now demonstrate that for Bebchuk's parameterization of
his model, where the initial expected value of the verdict is 100 and each party
incurs litigation costs of 70 per stage, the real option settlement value of the
lawsuit will be 100 for all values of A lower than 130. However, over the
interval A=130 through A=140, the lawsuit loses all credibility. This is the
lawsuit's "transition phase," or dead zone. Then, for values of A greater than
140, the settlement value initially equals 70 and monotonically increases as
variance increases. Thus, the credibility of Bebchuk's NEV lawsuit depends
critically on assumptions about the variance of the information disclosed during
litigation. This lawsuit's settlement value described as a function of variance is
illustrated in Figure 2, and these observations can be confirmed by running the
online calculator with the parameterization describing this model.
To illustrate this pattern of settlement values more explicitly, we begin by
first examining settlement dynamics when A=130 and B=70. If the court
selects A, then the plaintiff's minimum demand is 60, the defendant's
maximum offer is 200, and the case would settle for 130. If the court selects B,
the plaintiff will drop the lawsuit because it would cost the plaintiff 70 in
litigation expense to obtain a judgment of 70. In that event, viewed from the
perspective of Stage 1, the case has a 50% probability of a settlement of 130
and a 50% probability of a settlement of 0, for an expected value of 65.
However, it makes no sense for a plaintiff to file the lawsuit because the Stage
1 litigation costs of 70 exceed the lawsuit's expected value of 65. The claim as
a whole is therefore not credible.
Observe, however, that if the previous example is changed ever so slightly
106. See infra Appendix, Proposition 3.
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Figure 2: NEV Litigation with a "Dead Zone"
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so that the values are A=130-s and B=70+E, then the lawsuit would settle for
100 for the following reason: If the court selects A, then the plaintiff will
accept a settlement of no less than 60-c. The defendant will offer no more than
200-E. In that event, the litigation settles at the midpoint, or 130-s. If the court
selects B, the plaintiff will accept any amount in excess of C, the defendant will
pay any amount less than 140+p, and the parties settle for 70+E. The expected
value of these two anticipated settlements is thus 100. Viewed from the
beginning of Stage 1, the plaintiff would have to spend 70 to force a settlement
of 100, and the defendant would be forced to incur costs of 70 to pay a
settlement of 100. This situation induces a settlement at 100 and demonstrates
that the discontinuity arises immediately when A reaches 130.
Now consider the settlement value of the lawsuit when A=140 and B=60.
If the court selects A, then the plaintiff will demand at least 70, the defendant
will offer no more than 210, and the settlement midpoint is 140. If the court
selects B, then the plaintiff has no credible threat because it would be irrational
to spend 70 in pursuit of a 60 judgment. Thus, at the beginning of Stage 2, the
lawsuit has an expected value of 70. Viewed from the perspective of the
beginning of Stage 1, however, the lawsuit lacks credibility because it would
not be rational for the plaintiff to spend 70 in pursuit of 70.
However, if this example is changed so that the values are A=140+s and
B=60-s, then the lawsuit will settle for 70+s/2. If the court selects A, then the
plaintiff will accept no less than 70+s, the defendant will offer no more than
210+s, and the litigation will settle for the midpoint of 140+s. However, if the
court selects B, the plaintiff's claim lacks credibility because the plaintiff will
March 2006] 1303
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
not invest 70 in pursuit of 60-e. The lawsuit's settlement value prior to the
revelation of the information is thus viewed as a 50% probability of a
settlement value of 140+E, which is 70+F-/2. Viewed as of the beginning of
Stage 1, the plaintiff would demand a minimum of 62, the defendant would
offer nothing more than 140+62, and the case settles for the midpoint of
70+E/2. It also follows that all values of A equal to or greater than 130 and
equal to or less than 140 will generate a settlement value of 0.
This example demonstrates that when learning is possible, equilibrium
settlement values are not necessarily smooth functions of variance. The
intuition behind this finding is again that the presence of staged, lumpy
litigation costs combined with the sudden revelation of information can cause
discontinuities in equilibrium settlement values because the lumpiness in
litigation costs combined with the revelation of information can induce a
sudden loss of credibility. In the case of NEV litigation, however, when one
branch of the binomial distribution loses credibility, the remaining branch does
not necessarily have a value large enough to support the plaintiffs decision to
continue the litigation. 10 7 A dead zone then begins and continues until the
lawsuit's variance becomes large enough that the remaining branch promises an
outcome larger than Stage 2 litigation costs, at which point the lawsuit regains
credibility. Beyond that level of variance, the NEV lawsuit continues to be
credible and its option settlement value again increases monotonically as A
increases.
4. NEV litigation with a point discontinuity
A particularly interesting situation arises when the dead zone consists of a
single point. For example, assume that the expected judgment is 100, the
probability of outcome A is 0.5, the litigants have equal bargaining power, and
Stage 1 litigation costs are 75 for each party while Stage 2 litigation costs are
50. In this situation, the dead zone will constitute a single point where A=150.
Without working through the mechanics of the calculations, it can be shown,
and the online calculator demonstrates, that for levels of A less than 150 this
lawsuit will settle for 100, and for levels of A just above 150 the lawsuit will
settle for slightly more than 75. However, at the precise point where A=150,
the lawsuit is not credible. Intuitively, this result occurs because when A=150
and B=50 the outcome represented by the possibility of B suddenly becomes
noncredible, given Stage 2 litigation costs of 50, and the Stage 2 expected
settlement value of 75 (or 50% of 150) equals the Stage 1 litigation costs of 75.
Thus, the value of the lawsuit is precisely zero, although the very same lawsuit
has a positive option settlement value at any level of A higher or lower than
150.
107. Proposition 2 demonstrates that this pattern cannot arise for PEV lawsuits because
they are credible for every level of variance.
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This point discontinuity is driven by our assumption that when a settlement
value is zero, the lawsuit loses credibility. This assumption, which is common
in the literature, 10 8 could be replaced by the assumption that the plaintiff would
continue to litigate at this point of indifference because the decision to litigate,
which would still be costless to the plaintiff, can induce the defendant to make
a settlement payment that reflects a portion of the litigation costs that could be
avoided through a settlement. In this specific case, the result would be that the
defendant would agree to pay precisely 75 at the point where A=150, and the
point discontinuity would be eliminated.
These observations about the model's behavior at this point of
discontinuity also suggest areas for further research relating to alternative
equilibrium concepts in litigation games. These alternative concepts would
recognize the possibility of extortionist incentives in plaintiff behavior (i.e., the
possibility that a plaintiff can credibly threaten to continue with a lawsuit that
has a negative expected payoff because the payoff to the defendant is even
more negative, and the plaintiff calculates that the defendant can be induced to
make a settlement payment to avoid this more adverse outcome) and the
possibility that a plaintiff experiences schadenfreude through litigation (i.e.,
even though the plaintiff experiences a negative payoff from the litigation, the
plaintiff gains value from the ability to inflict losses on the defendant). These
potential extensions of the model are discussed in Part V.
IV. ANALYTIC RESULTS
We defined our model in Part II, and in Part III we provided a series of
examples that illustrate our model's equilibrium concept with particular
emphasis on results that do not otherwise appear in the literature. Here, we
describe fourteen formal propositions regarding our model's equilibrium
characteristics. These propositions address three broad subject areas.
Our first set of propositions, four in number, describes conditions under
which a plaintiff's threat to sue is credible. Simply put, a lawsuit is credible in
our model only if its option settlement value, S*, is positive because rational
defendants will refuse to pay anything to settle claims that all parties
understand have no value. These credibility conditions, presented in Part IV.A,
therefore describe necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
108. Although much of the literature makes this assumption, some differ as to what to
do with the point of indifference. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 31, at 12 n.9. Bebchuk
adopts the contrary assumption that "in the event of indifference between proceeding and not
proceeding, the plaintiff will proceed." Id. This assumption, however, raises the question of
whether the plaintiff proceeds in the expectation that he will be able to extract a portion of
the defendant's avoided litigation costs and of why the defendant would view the threat as
credible if there is no gain to the plaintiff but for the defendant's willingness to share a
portion of those avoided litigation costs. To avoid those issues, we assume that the plaintiff
does not proceed unless he has a threat that is credible independent of the defendant's
willingness to share avoided litigation costs.
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litigation in our model. These credibility conditions also provide basic formulae
that can be used to calculate a lawsuit's settlement value and are therefore
fundamental to further understanding our model's operation.
Our second set of propositions, also four in number, compares a lawsuit's
option settlement value with its "divisibility settlement value" and with the
expected value of the lawsuit's judgment. A lawsuit's divisibility settlement
value describes the settlement value that results if (1) a plaintiff simply has an
option to abandon a lawsuit between stages and (2) no payoff-relevant
information is revealed during the course of litigation. These propositions,
defined in Part IV.B, focus on circumstances in which the ability to learn
payoff-relevant information, as reflected by a lawsuit's variance and as
distinguished from the simple ability to abandon a lawsuit in midstream,
influences a lawsuit's value.
Our third set of propositions, six in number, describes a series of
comparative statics analyses.' 0 9 These analyses describe how a lawsuit's option
settlement value responds to changes in the variance of the uncertainty to be
resolved, changes in the parties' relative litigation costs, changes in the
allocation of litigation costs over time, and changes in the parties' relative
bargaining power. We also present a proposition that demonstrates how, if we
abandon our assumption of homogeneous beliefs, a difference in beliefs over a
lawsuit's variance is sufficient to trigger litigation and then to settle midstream,
even though the litigants agree as to the lawsuit's expected value. These results
are presented in Part IV.C.
We describe our propositions in this Part along with the intuition that
supports the proof of each proposition. We present both formal statements and
mathematical proofs of these propositions in the Appendix.
A. Credibility Conditions
We begin by asking a basic question: When will a lawsuit be credible in
our model and, if a lawsuit is credible, for how much will it settle? Proposition
1 answers these questions and describes a general condition for credibility of
litigation as it applies to both positive expected value (PEV) and negative
expected value (NEV) litigation. We define a lawsuit as being credible if its
initial settlement value, S*, is positive, or S* > 0. A lawsuit is credible as
defined here if and only if a plaintiff has a credible threat at the start of each
stage to continue the litigation. This additional condition is necessary because,
if the defendant perceives that the lawsuit is not credible at the beginning of
any stage, then the defendant knows that it is irrational for the plaintiff to invest
109. BRIAN BEAVIS & IAN DOBBS, OPTIMIZATION AND STABILITY THEORY FOR
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 98 (1990) (defining comparative statics analysis to be "[t]he
determination of the effects of parameter variations on the optimal choice of control
variables and the maximum value of the objective function").
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anything in the lawsuit at Stage 1 only to have to walk away empty-handed at a
later point in the process.
We compute the value of S* by reasoning backward. If the litigation
reaches Stage 2, a plaintiff will demand a settlement at least as large as the
amount it expects to receive at judgment net of its Stage 2 litigation costs. A
defendant's maximum offer, if Stage 2 is reached, is at most what it expects to
pay at judgment plus Stage 2 litigation costs. Because we assume that both
litigants have equal bargaining power at each stage, the settlement value at the
start of Stage 2, which we denote by S2, splits the difference between the
plaintiffs minimum settlement demand in Stage 2 and the defendant's
maximum settlement offer in Stage 2.
At Stage 1, the plaintiff will demand a settlement at least as large as the
amount it expects to receive in settlement just prior to the revelation of
information, S2, net of its Stage 1 litigation costs. At Stage 1, the defendant will
offer a settlement no greater than the amount it expects to pay in settlement at
the start of Stage 2, S2, plus its Stage 1 litigation costs, if the plaintiff's threat of
proceeding to Stage 2 is credible. Again, because of the assumption of equal
bargaining power, at the start of Stage 1, before a plaintiff decides whether to
pay for Stage 1 litigation costs,, this lawsuit has a settlement value, S*, which
splits the difference between the plaintiffs minimum settlement demand in
Stage 1 and the defendant's maximum settlement offer in Stage 1. Proposition
1 defines the formula for calculating S* and thereby establishes a foundation
from which it is possible to describe credibility of all PEV and NEV litigation
as well as to calculate the settlement value of those claims.
Having derived the definition of S* and having demonstrated that it is
central to determining whether a lawsuit is credible, we next explore the
differences in credibility conditions as they relate to PEV and NEV litigation.
In particular, we ask whether PEV lawsuits are always credible. As intuition
suggests, our model supports the conclusion that PEV lawsuits are always
credible and will always lead to payment of some amount in settlement.
Proposition 2 proves this result by demonstrating that there is no circumstance
in which a PEV lawsuit would fail to be credible. Proposition 2 reasons that if a
lawsuit is PEV, then, by definition, the plaintiffs total litigation costs are less
than the expected judgment for every level of variance. Proposition 2 also
observes that, for any level of a plaintiff's litigation costs and for any level of
variance, a lawsuit is least likely to be credible if all litigation costs are incurred
in Stage 1. However, because those costs will always be less than the expected
value of the judgment, Proposition 2 is able to demonstrate that every PEV
lawsuit must be credible for every level of variance.
While every PEV lawsuit is credible for every level of variance, it does not
follow that every NEV lawsuit is credible for every level of variance, although
every NEV lawsuit can be made credible with sufficient variance. Proposition 3
demonstrates the second half of this assertion by proving that if variance is
allowed to grow without limit, then every NEV lawsuit can become credible.
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The logic behind this finding is rather straightforward. Imagine a call option
that is out of the money. As the variance of the underlying instrument
increases, the value of the call option also increases, even though it remains out
of the money. At some point the increase in variance can become large enough
to cause the option's premium value to exceed any exogenously predetermined
value, which here represents the plaintiffs litigation costs. When a previously
noncredible NEV lawsuit's variance crosses that threshold, the lawsuit becomes
credible. This result is a strong proposition regarding the potential credibility of
even the weakest of claims as might be measured under traditional expected
value criteria and suggests that in the context of NEV litigation uncertainty can
be a powerful tool in the hands of plaintiffs seeking to bring claims.
The fact that every NEV lawsuit is credible for a sufficiently high level of
variance does not, however, prove that every NEV lawsuit is credible over any
level of variance. Indeed, we have already illustrated in Part III conditions
under which some NEV lawsuits are credible only over certain ranges of
variance. More generally, Proposition 4 demonstrates that if an NEV lawsuit's
variance is constrained so as to preclude any negative payoffs to the plaintiff,
then there exists a category of NEV lawsuits that will never be credible. The
intuition underlying this nonnegativity constraint is that a court's judgment can
never go against a plaintiff so badly that a plaintiff must suffer a loss of wealth
as a consequence of a court's judgment, as opposed to a loss in wealth
generated by having to bear litigation expenses. 
10
B. Option Settlement Value, Divisibility Value, and Expected Value
Having mapped circumstances under which PEV and NEV lawsuits are or
are not credible, we next present four propositions that compare and contrast a
lawsuit's option settlement value with its divisibility value and its expected
value. A lawsuit's divisibility value describes the amount for which a claim
would settle in our model if the uncertainty that a court resolves at the end of
Stage I has no variance or, as explained below, otherwise lacks economic value
because it would not change either litigant's behavior. This settlement value is,
as previously described, equivalent to the equilibrium settlement value
calculated by Bebchuk, 11 and our analysis demonstrates that Bebchuk's model
is a special case of ours in which information has no payoff-relevant value. The
difference between a lawsuit's option settlement value and its divisibility value
therefore measures the value of the information that is disclosed between our
model's two stages, as distinct from value that exists simply because of a
plaintiffs ability to abandon litigation midstream. We demonstrate that the
value of information, so measured, can be positive or negative and is a function
of underlying variance. We also compare and contrast the expected value of a
110. See supra note 65.
111. See supra Parts I1I.C. 1, III.C.3
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lawsuit's judgment with its option settlement value and again demonstrate that
this difference can be positive or negative.
When does a lawsuit's option settlement value equal its divisibility value?
We present a pair of propositions analyzing that relationship. Proposition 5
demonstrates that if variance is constrained to be zero for an otherwise credible
lawsuit, then the lawsuit's option settlement value equals its divisibility
settlement value. This demonstrates that Bebchuk's model with divisible
litigation costs is a special case of our model in which variance is zero. To say
that variance of uncertainty that a court resolves is zero means that a court's
ruling reveals no payoff-relevant information but the plaintiff still has an option
to abandon the litigation, thus giving him the ability to stage litigation costs. 
112
Proposition 6 extends Proposition 5 and describes a broader set of
conditions under which a lawsuit's option settlement value equals its
divisibility value. Information has no value to litigants if they do not change
their behavior because of the information revealed. It follows that a lawsuit's
option settlement value will equal its divisibility value if information is
worthless to litigants. Proposition 6 defines the circumstances under which
information is economically worthless.
It is trivially easy to demonstrate that when variance becomes sufficiently
large a lawsuit's option settlement value will exceed its divisibility value. But
precisely when does this condition arise? Proposition 7 demonstrates that if
variance in our model is constrained to lead only to nonnegative outcomes, and
if a defendant's Stage 2 litigation costs are constrained to equal or exceed a
plaintiff's Stage 2 litigation costs, then a lawsuit's option settlement value
cannot exceed its divisibility value. This finding is significant because it
demonstrates, as has already been illustrated, that there are circumstances in
which addition of learning and abandonment options can actually reduce a
lawsuit's settlement value below its divisibility value.
To this point, we have formally explored the relationship between a
lawsuit's option settlement value and its divisibility value. The literature,
however, more commonly addresses the relationship between litigation and the
expected value of a lawsuit's judgment. Proposition 8 addresses this
relationship and offers necessary and sufficient conditions under which the
initial expected value of a lawsuit's judgment (as distinguished from the
lawsuit's net initial expected value) equals both that lawsuit's divisibility value
and its option settlement value. Proposition 8 demonstrates that this equality
requires two conditions when litigants have equal bargaining power. First, a
plaintiff must be willing to continue with litigation regardless of information
disclosed (i.e., the information must have no economic value). Second, litigants
must have equal litigation costs. If these conditions are not satisfied, there will
be a divergence between the expected value of the judgment, a lawsuit's option
112. We already provided an explanation of the circumstances in which we also
generate the Cornell model as a special case in Part I.C.
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settlement value, and its divisibility value.
C. Comparative Statics
Our concluding six propositions provide a comparative statics perspective
on our model. We examine how a lawsuit's option settlement value varies in
response to changes in underlying variance, total litigation costs, allocation of
litigation costs across time periods, changes in parties' relative litigation costs,
and changes in parties' bargaining power. We also describe how, if we relax
our assumption of homogeneous beliefs, our model allows for litigation to
commence at Stage 1 simply because the litigants disagree about the variance
of the uncertainty to be resolved (although they agree as to the lawsuit's
expected value) and then to settle immediately after information disclosure.
The relationship between a lawsuit's option settlement value and its
underlying variance, even in a world of risk-neutral litigants, is a central focus
of our analysis. Proposition 9 formally addresses that relationship and
demonstrates that it is more complex in our model than is typically the case in
modeling standard financial options. More specifically, Proposition 9
emphasizes that a lawsuit's option settlement value becomes a monotonically
increasing function of its variance only after its variance becomes sufficiently
large. At that point, the relationship between a lawsuit's option value and its
underlying variance tracks the standard relationship found in finance, i.e.,
higher volatility implies higher option valuation.113 However, if a lawsuit's
variance is not sufficiently large, then its option settlement value can be
invariant to the underlying volatility (because the information to be revealed
has no economic value) or can fall discontinuously. Moreover, for some NEV
litigation, a lawsuit that is credible over lower and higher levels of variance can
lose credibility over intermediate levels of variance. Figures 1 and 2, previously
presented in Part III, illustrate Proposition 9 for PEV and NEV litigation.
The observation that every lawsuit's option settlement value is a strictly
increasing function of its underlying variance beyond some critical value also
supports a proposition with potentially widespread significance for the analysis
of litigation. In particular, as Proposition 10 demonstrates, once variance is
sufficiently large that the lawsuit's option settlement value becomes a strictly
increasing function of variance, the risk-neutral plaintiff will appear to be risk-
seeking because he will demand increasingly large payments to settle
increasingly risky cases, while the risk-neutral defendant will appear to be risk-
averse because he will offer increasingly large payments to settle increasingly
risky cases.
To this point, we have in our examples assumed that plaintiffs' and
defendants' litigation costs are equal in both stages. This assumption is clearly
unrealistic. There are cases in which plaintiffs have significant leverage over
113. See Rasmusen, supra note 63.
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Figure 3: Effect of Reduced Plaintiff Litigation
Costs in NEV Litigation with a "Dead Zone"
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defendants in the sense that the plaintiffs expenditure of a dollar can cause a
disproportionately larger expenditure by the defendant. Similarly, there are
cases in which defendants have significant leverage over plaintiffs in the sense
that the plaintiff can be forced to spend many dollars to prosecute the action for
each dollar spent on defense costs. Proposition 11 explores the implications of
changes in the plaintiffs litigation expenditures and demonstrates that if a
plaintiff's litigation costs decrease (increase) while all other parameters in our
model remain fixed, including the defendant's litigation costs, then the
lawsuit's option settlement value increases (decreases) as does the size of the
discontinuity (if one exists) and its location measured as a function of A. These
results indicate that the relationship between the plaintiff's litigation costs and
lawsuit valuation are more complex than the simple intuitively plausible
assertion that lower plaintiff litigation costs make lawsuits more valuable for
plaintiffs because changes in those costs can also influence a lawsuit's
credibility and the location and magnitude of discontinuities in its option
settlement value.
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 11. Figure 3 first replicates the relationship
between option settlement value and variance that was previously described in
Figure 2. That relationship, described by the solid lines in Figure 3, arises when
each litigant has costs of 70 in each period for a lawsuit in which the expected
value of the judgment is 100, the litigants have equal bargaining power, and the
probability of A is fixed at 0.5. The dotted lines in Figure 3 then overlay the
lawsuit's option settlement values that arise when the plaintiffs litigation costs
are reduced to 55 in each period, a cost level that still causes the lawsuit to be
NEV from the plaintiffs perspective. At that level, the dead zone disappears
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Figure 4: Stage 1 Costs > Stage 2 Costs
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because the lawsuit is then credible for every level of A, the lawsuit's
settlement value increases from 100 to 115 when information has no value, the
single point of discontinuity arises at a higher level of A (here A=145), and the
lawsuit's settlement value beyond its point of discontinuity is uniformly higher
than the equivalent settlement value that results when the plaintiff has higher
litigation costs. This reduction in litigation costs here causes the lawsuit to
become uniformly more valuable to the plaintiff and eliminates the possibility
that it will be noncredible over some intermediate levels of variance.
Our model has also, to this point, assumed a fixed distribution of litigation
costs across the two stages of litigation and has therefore not considered the
implications of procedural rules that cause litigation expenses either to be
"front-loaded"--meaning that, all other factors equal, the parties have to spend
more earlier in the lawsuit-or "back-loaded"-meaning that expenses are
incurred in the later stage of the litigation. Proposition 12 demonstrates that the
timing of litigation costs can have a significant effect on a lawsuit's credibility
and option settlement value. In particular, all other factors constant, a rule that
causes litigation costs to be front-loaded will tend to reduce a lawsuit's option
settlement value because a plaintiff must then incur larger expenses before
gaining the advantage of the information that is disclosed at the end of Stage 1.
Because credibility conditions are also existence conditions, it follows that
even if total litigation costs are held constant, rules allocating litigation costs
between two stages can alone be sufficient to cause litigants either to institute
proceedings or never to file an action.
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 12 and again replicates the relationship
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illustrated in Figure 2, but now overlays the lawsuit's option settlement value
on the assumption that Stage 1 litigation costs are 90 for each litigant and that
Stage 2 litigation costs are 50 for each litigant. This cost front-loading causes
the lawsuit's dead zone to shift and expand, moving from the range of 130 : A
< 140 to 150 _ A _< 180, but it does not cause any change in the lawsuit's
divisibility value at levels of variance low enough to make the lawsuit credible
or at levels of variance high enough to have passed through the dead zone.
Our model has also assumed that the litigants have equal bargaining power,
although plaintiffs or defendants can have disproportionate bargaining power in
practice. Proposition 13 shows that changes in litigants' relative bargaining
power can cause cases to be brought or to be dropped and can cause significant
changes in equilibrium settlement values. More specifically, Proposition 13
shows that as a plaintiffs bargaining power increases (decreases), more (fewer)
NEV lawsuits become credible, and option settlement values increase
(decrease). Proposition 13 also demonstrates that an increase (decrease) in a
plaintiff's bargaining power can have a disproportionate effect in the sense that
a 10% increase (decrease) in a plaintiff's bargaining power can lead to a larger
than 10% increase (decrease) in a lawsuit's option settlement value, and can
create (destroy) a lawsuit's credibility when a lawsuit is NEV or when a
plaintiffs litigation costs in Stage 1 are sufficiently large.
Figure 5 illustrates Proposition 13. Furthermore, Figure 5 again replicates
the relationship illustrated in Figure 2 but now overlays the lawsuit's option
settlement value on the assumption that a plaintiff has more bargaining power
than a defendant-in particular, that a=0.6. Thus, instead of equally splitting
the difference between a plaintiffs offer and a defendant's offer at each stage
of their bargaining process, settlement at each stage consists of 60% of the
defendant's higher settlement offer and 40% of the plaintiffs lower settlement
demand. As illustrated in the overlay on Figure 5, even this small change in
bargaining power eliminates the dead zone, causes the lawsuit's option
settlement value to increase to 128 for all values of A at which information has
no economic value, and causes the lawsuit's settlement value to be uniformly
higher for every level of variance beyond the single discontinuity that now
arises at A=130. Indeed, the increase in option settlement values is, in
percentage terms, at every stage greater than the increase in plaintiffs
bargaining power.
Finally, we demonstrate that our model can be modified slightly to address
the common (but unsatisfying) characteristic of many models of the litigation
process that implies that lawsuits settle at inception without the litigants
incurring any litigation costs. 114 This prediction is obviously unrealistic
because a very large number of lawsuits are indeed filed, many billions of
dollars are spent on litigation costs, and the large majority of claims settled
114. See supra notes 44, 84.
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Figure 5: Plaintiff Has Greater Bargaining Power
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before going to trial. 115 The literature demonstrates, however, that economic
models of litigation cannot replicate this pattern unless they assume that the
parties have asymmetric information or differential expectations. 116 A small
modification to our model, however, allows us to generate a pattern in which
the plaintiff files suit and both parties incur Stage 1 litigation costs, but the
parties then settle before incurring Stage 2 expenses: we simply allow the
litigants to have differential expectations over the lawsuit's variance, even
though they are constrained to share common expectations as to the judgment's
expected value and as to all other parameters of the model. This finding is, we
believe, potentially important because it suggests that subtle differences over
the second moments of probability distributions can be sufficient to cause
litigants rationally to invest substantial sums in pursuing a lawsuit only to settle
prior to final judgment. To put the matter more bluntly, our model suggests that
even if litigants agree about a lawsuit's expected value, as traditionally defined
through DCF or NPV analyses, it can be entirely rational for them to incur
substantial litigation costs before settling because they disagree about finer
points of the litigation process, such as the potential range of outcomes that can
drive the agreed-upon expected value.
To illustrate this result, we modify our model to allow the litigants to have
differential expectations only over the lawsuit's variance and introduce the
possibility that, after Stage 1 costs have been incurred, the court specifies the
range of decisions that it may reach without actually committing to a specific
115. See Silver, supra note 44, at 2107-09.
116. See supra note 86.
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decision within the range. Such an announcement would eliminate the
opportunity for differential expectations over the variance of the uncertainty to
be resolved without actually resolving that uncertainty. An example of such a
situation would be the announcement that a court has accepted or rejected a
damage theory that supports a wider range of damage awards without actually
deciding a host of other factors that would be necessary to calculate actual
damages. Proposition 14 demonstrates that, in this situation, differential
expectations as to the lawsuit's variance can be sufficient to cause litigants to
initiate a lawsuit and then to settle midstream once that difference of opinion as
to variance has been eliminated. The Appendix provides a numerical example
that illustrates this equilibrium pattern.
V. DISCUSSION AND EXTENSIONS
The real options model of litigation described and analyzed in this Article,
although rudimentary, has material analytic and normative implications for the
economic analysis of litigation. From an analytic perspective, the model
generates a set of results that is either difficult or impossible to derive from
other models of the litigation process. Part V.A describes these results and
discusses their significance. Part V.B discusses the model's normative
implications for the economic analysis of the litigation process. Part V.C
describes a series of potential extensions.
A. Analytic Implications
From an analytic perspective, a real options model of the litigation process
elucidates the relationship between a lawsuit's uncertainty and a plaintiff's
ability to manage that uncertainty. That relationship is entirely obscured by
traditional models that rely on DCF or NPV analyses. In particular, the real
options approach suggests that "riskier" lawsuits can be more valuable to risk-
neutral plaintiffs than "safer" lawsuits if the plaintiff is able to reduce or
eliminate his litigation expenditures sufficiently in the event the lawsuit evolves
poorly from the plaintiffs perspective. It also suggests that the relationship
between a lawsuit's settlement value and its underlying risk can be quite
complex: settlement values can be discontinuous in the lawsuit's underlying
variance, and some NEV lawsuits can be credible over lower and higher levels
of variance, while being noncredible over intermediate values of variance.
These rather basic insights help cast a new light on several aspects of the
litigation process. For example, the credibility of NEV litigation is transformed
from a conundrum that requires complex assumptions to explain away, 117 to a
rather straightforward proposition regarding the value of out-of-the-money call




options. NEV lawsuits are perfectly credible in our model provided that the
lawsuit's variance is sufficiently high. Indeed, every NEV lawsuit can be made
credible if one assumes a sufficiently large variance, 118 just as the value of
every out-of-the-money call option can be increased to exceed any fixed
premium value if the variance of the underlying instrument is allowed to
become sufficiently large. Further, because PEV lawsuits are credible at every
level of variance,1 19 while NEV lawsuits require some minimal level of
variance to become credible, the effect of variance on settlement values can be
viewed as an alternative characteristic that distinguishes PEV from NEV
litigation.
It also follows that, all other factors equal, if the uncertainty of the
litigation process increases, then the number of PEV lawsuits that are brought
will remain constant because these lawsuits are credible at every level of
variance. In contrast, the incidence of NEV litigation will increase or remain
stable, 120 because only those lawsuits become increasingly credible as variance
increases. To the extent that some observers view NEV lawsuits as undesirable,
increased uncertainty in the litigation process will generate a greater incentive
to file more undesirable lawsuits. It bears emphasis that this observation relates
only to the number of lawsuits that are initiated. It is not an observation
regarding the aggregate option settlement value of the lawsuits that are filed
because increased variance can, in theory, increase or decrease the options
settlement value of PEV and NEV lawsuits alike.1 2 1 However, once variance
becomes sufficiently large, the effect of an increase in variance is an
unambiguous increase in a lawsuit's options settlement value. 122
Traditional DCF and NPV models cannot generate predictions of this sort
because in a world of risk-neutral litigants, DCF and NPV models suggest that
changes in variance have no effect on a lawsuit's credibility or settlement
value. This point is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that risk-neutral
defendants in our model can act as though they are risk-averse, and risk-neutral
plaintiffs can act as though they are risk-seeking for reasons that have nothing
to do with risk aversion and everything to do with the value of the plaintiff's
ability to abandon the lawsuit in the event of information unfavorable to the
plaintiffs cause. 123 Models that assume that defendants are relatively risk-
averse, 124 therefore, may be making an analytically unnecessary assumption.
Moreover, if plaintiffs are in fact relatively risk-seeking while defendants are
118. See infra Appendix, Proposition 3.
119. See infra Appendix, Proposition 2.
120. As a technical matter, we cannot argue that the number will strictly increase
because of the possibility that increased variance will, over some ranges, drive some NEV
lawsuits into their dead zones. See infra Appendix, Proposition 9.
121. See id
122. Seeid.
123. See infra Appendix, Proposition 10.
124. For an example of such a model, see SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 406-07.
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relatively risk-averse, then our real options model's prediction can be
magnified over certain ranges (i.e., risk-adjusted option settlement values
would be higher than their risk-neutral equivalents). On the other hand, if
plaintiffs are in fact relatively risk-averse and defendants are relatively risk-
seeking, then our model's prediction can be tempered (i.e., risk-adjusted option
settlement values would be lower than their risk-neutral equivalents).
The model's comparative statics results also suggest that real options
models can promote a new style of analysis that integrates procedural and
substantive considerations. Changes in procedural rules can increase or
decrease the parties' litigation costs; they can change the underlying decision
process inherent in a lawsuit by, for example, adding or eliminating the need to
make various evidentiary showings; they can cause litigants to incur expenses
earlier or later in the litigation process; and they can otherwise influence the
litigants' relative bargaining power. Changes in procedural rules can also
increase or decrease the uncertainty that arises at various stages of the litigation
process. Substantive rules can change the expected value and variance of the
judgment awarded at the conclusion of litigation, as well as the variance
associated with decisions made in the course of the lawsuit's prosecution. The
real options perspective provides a coherent framework through which such
changes can be evaluated individually or as part of a larger reform process.
Traditional DCF or NPV models, which mask the influence of uncertainty and
flexibility in the litigation process, are simply unable to address these concerns
in a consistent manner.
Finally, the full-information version of our model shares the common
characteristic that litigants tend to settle the lawsuit at its inception rather than
actually spend any resources prosecuting the action.125 In order for litigation to
ensue, it is typically necessary to assume some form of differential expectations
or asymmetric information. Our model demonstrates, however, that even subtle
forms of disagreement can support significant litigation expenditures before
lawsuits settle midstream. In particular, we demonstrate that parties who agree
as to the lawsuit's expected value and who differ only as to the lawsuit's
variance can rationally incur Stage 1 litigation expenses only to settle once the
court or third parties affect the parties' understanding of the variance of the
underlying dispute. This finding, which again cannot be derived through a
traditional DCF or NPV formulation, suggests that a real option perspective
generates insights regarding the operation of the litigation process that are
valuable and unique.
B. Normative Implications
A central normative proposition of the economic analysis of law is that
litigation induces efficient resource allocation if the substantive rules of
125. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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liability and damages are properly defined. The Hand Formula, for example,
describes a rule for the optimal definition of negligence standards. 126 The
"efficient breach hypothesis" maintains that "court-ordered expectations
damages (a liability rule) lead parties to maintain or abandon prior agreements
efficiently." 127 Although the efficient breach argument was initially developed
in the context of contract law, it has been broadly applied to generate similar
"efficiency-based arguments... to promote the use of liability rules within the
context of tort, property, corporate, and constitutional law." 128 The Coase
Theorem's suggestion that the initial allocation of resources can be irrelevant to
their ultimate efficient distribution 129 similarly relies on a court's ability to set
efficient damage awards. In each of these instances, the normative prescription
assumes that litigation will, on average and over time, generate damage awards
that equal the amounts described by the underlying substantive standards.
It is well understood, however, that litigation is a highly imperfect process.
Indeed, "the private incentive to bring suit is fundamentally misaligned with the
socially optimal incentive, and the deviation between them could be in either
direction." 130 Plaintiffs are sometimes overstimulated to file private actions that
can saddle too many defendants with inefficiently large liabilities. Plaintiffs
also sometimes labor under insufficient incentives to litigate against defendants
who can inefficiently escape liability. The causes of these divergences are
legion, and it is unnecessary to catalogue them in this context.
131
The real options perspective, however, suggests that uncertainty alone can
cause private and social incentives to litigate to diverge even in a world of risk-
neutral, equally informed, and equally powerful litigants who do not labor
under any of the conditions that would otherwise cause such a divergence to
arise. It follows that the relationship between uncertainty and litigation's social
optimality is more complex than has previously been suggested in the literature.
In particular, the assumption that the litigants are risk-neutral is insufficient to
eliminate uncertainty's effect on the calculation of a lawsuit's settlement value
or on a plaintiff's incentive to sue. Instead, in order to equate private and social
incentives to litigate, it appears necessary to assume that the uncertainty
involved in a lawsuit is sufficiently small such that it does not cause the
lawsuit's option settlement value to diverge from its expected value.
126. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 10, at 333-37.
127. Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 385.
128. Id.
129. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
130. SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 391; see also sources cited supra note 51.
131. Commonly cited causes for this divergence include: litigation costs; asymmetric
information; the mismatch between the private gain from litigation and the social benefit of
the deterrence generated by litigation; social costs of operating a legal system that are not
borne by litigants; and the tendency for lawsuits to settle for amounts that are either too large
or too small relative to the socially optimal payment from defendant to plaintiff. See
SHAVELL, supra note 25, at 391-401, 411-15.
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But how realistic is this sort of an assumption? Several factors suggest that
it may not be realistic at all. Lawsuits are, after all, filled with uncertainty over
the facts of the underlying case. How will witnesses testify? Will testimony be
credible? Which e-mails will turn up in production? Indeed, all one has to do is
look into a jury's eyes to recognize how random the litigation process can
be, 132 and some recent studies suggest that "to the extent that there is a concern
about unpredictable damage awards, deliberation [of the sort observed in the
jury process] is not likely to alleviate that concern, and is indeed likely to
aggravate it."' 133 Thus, "[u]npredictability is a serious problem for jury verdicts,
partly because it ensures that the similarly situated will often not be treated
similarly... ,,134 Indeed, the category-bound nature of the litigation process
ends up creating "predictably incoherent judgments" that further contribute to
the uncertainty of the litigation process. 1
35
The roots of uncertainty in the litigation process also extend far beyond the
jury room. Legislatures have strong political incentives to enact vague or
ambiguous statutes that cause confusion and uncertainty when they are
implemented by courts. 1 3 6 Judges who practice "minimalist" decisionmaking
may well be following a modest and rational style of jurisprudence with much
to commend it,137 but the narrow scope of minimalist decisionmaking can
"inject substantial uncertainty into an area of law."' 138 Rationally ambiguous
legislators, minimalist judges, and inconsistent fact-finders thus seem to assure
that uncertainty is and will continue to be hardwired into the litigation process,
notwithstanding occasional efforts to impose consistency.
139
132. See, e.g., CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, WINNING LEGALLY: How MANAGERS CAN USE
THE LAW To CREATE VALUE, MARSHAL RESOURCES, AND MANAGE RISK 215 (2005)
("Litigation-especially before a jury-can have a lottery quality.").
133. David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1139, 1168 (2000).
134. Id. Schkade et al. also suggest that uncertainty is troublesome in part because "it
may produce over-deterrence in risk-averse defendants," id, but our analysis suggests that
the implications of uncertainty are troublesome even in the absence of risk-aversion.
135. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV.
1153 (2002).
136. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple
Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54
STAN. L. REV. 627 (2002); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575 (2002).
137. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1999).
138. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 628 (1997) (citing
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 6, 16, 18, 25
(1996)).
139. The most notable effort to impose consistency on the litigation process is
reflected in the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which required federal
sentencing judges to consider the "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct," 18 U.S.C. §
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These observations suggest an "impossibility conjecture" that has
potentially significant implications for the normative analysis of the litigation
process. If it is true that uncertainty is an essential characteristic of the litigation
process, and that uncertainty cannot be reduced to a degree sufficient to equate
the private and social incentives to litigate (by causing lawsuits' option
settlement values not to diverge from their expected or terminal values), then
the real options perspective suggests that other assumptions about the
efficiency or fairness of the private litigation process, no matter how heroic or
numerous, will be insufficient to equate private and social incentives to litigate.
Put another way, uncertainty alone can be sufficient to throw a monkey wrench
into the proposition that private litigation can systematically be relied upon to
achieve optimal social objectives even in a risk-neutral world.
This impossibility conjecture can be stated more formally as a combination
of three propositions. First, if uncertainty is sufficiently large, then the private
incentive to litigate will diverge from the socially optimal incentive even if all
parties are risk-neutral and all other conditions necessary to equate private and
social incentives are satisfied. Second, while we are aware of no data squarely
on point, the uncertainty inherent in the litigation process seems sufficiently
large and pervasive that private and public incentives to litigate may be
destined to diverge for a large category of lawsuits simply because of the
existence of that uncertainty.14 0 Third, it may be impossible to reduce litigation
3553(a)(6) (2006), and required judges to follow, in most cases, the Sentencing Guidelines
established by the United States Sentencing Commission, id. § 3553(b). In January 2005,
however, the Supreme Court rejected the Guidelines as unconstitutional because they caused
sentences to be increased on the basis of offense characteristics that were not found by a jury
beyond reasonable doubt, and held that the Guidelines could not be treated as mandatory.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244-46 (2005). Even before the Court's decision in
Booker, there was doubt that the Guidelines had in fact overcome the institutional factors
that promote disparity in the sentencing process. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III, The
Failure of Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLuM. L. REV. 1315,
1326-27 (2005) ("The available evidence suggests that the guidelines have succeeded in
reducing judge-to-judge disparity within judicial districts. On the other hand, researchers
have found significant disparities between sentences imposed on similarly situated
defendants in different districts and different regions of the country, and interdistrict
disparities appear to have grown larger in the guidelines era, particularly in drug cases. The
question of whether the guidelines reduced or exacerbated racial disparities in federal
sentencing remains unresolved.") (footnotes omitted).
140. Substantial scholarship supports the proposition that uncertainty is rife in the
litigation process. See, e.g., Schkade et al., supra note 133, at 1145-46 ("[T]he legal system
is pervaded by a degree of unpredictability and variance, resulting in apparent arbitrariness,
as the similarly situated are treated differently. An extensive study of pain and suffering
cases found that as much as 60% of the awards consists of 'noise,' unexplained by objective
factors. A study of all reported sexual harassment cases was unable to connect either
compensatory or punitive awards to any case characteristics that might be thought to explain
jury judgments.") (footnotes omitted). The literature, however, tends not to quantify the
magnitude of this uncertainty in a form that would rigorously support the proposition cited in
the text. We therefore state our proposition in a modest form that does appear to be
supported by the literature.
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uncertainty to a point where it becomes irrelevant from a real options
perspective because the political and judicial branches operate under
institutional incentives that perpetuate litigation uncertainty. Further, juries and
other decisionmakers are subject to a wide variety of deliberative imperfections
that generate uncertainty, even if they do not cause bias. If these observations
are correct, then private and social incentives to litigate cannot be equated for a
large number of lawsuits, notwithstanding other litigation reforms that might be
adopted. Our inability to prove the second empirical proposition as a formal
matter renders this observation no more than a conjecture. However, the
pervasive nature of uncertainty in the litigation process suggests that the
conjecture may well be highly plausible.
This impossibility conjecture, if correct, calls into question the common
assumption that substantive rules of law can be crafted to generate socially
optimal deterrence or compensation through litigation. 14 1 Instead, in order to
generate socially optimal rules, it appears necessary to consider the procedural
environment in which substantive rules are litigated, the ambiguities inherent in
the rules' articulation, and the unavoidable uncertainties of the litigation
process. If this perspective is correct, then substance cannot be separated from
procedure in pursuit of socially optimal rules of law, and the entire normative
exercise requires a larger, more general equilibrium framework in which
substantive standards are optimized with respect to the procedural environment
in which they are enforced and with respect to the uncertainty that they are
likely to encounter in application. We do not suggest that this observation is
novel. 142 We do, however, suggest that the identification of uncertainty as a
sufficient cause for a divergence between private and social incentives to
litigate underscores the value of modeling approaches that simultaneously
integrate substantive and procedural concerns, such as the real options
approach described in this Article.
These observations regarding the normative implications of the real options
perspective raise a related pragmatic question about the operation of the
litigation process. At one level, the simple binary model presented in this
Article is agnostic with regard to the effects of uncertainty on the incentive to
litigate because, in theory, uncertainty can increase or decrease the incentive to
litigate. However, the model also suggests that if uncertainty becomes
sufficiently large, it will unambiguously increase plaintiffs incentive to
litigate. The model further suggests that uncertainty can cause NEV litigation to
be credible even if the substantive rule of law suggests that plaintiff's recovery
141. For a discussion of this general assumption, see supra note 54. Another
implication of this observation is that the large literature discussing the conditions under
which the Coase Theorem is true may have to be expanded to include an additional
requirement that the uncertainty involved in enforcing the litigation contemplated by the
Theorem is sufficiently small. Again, if this assumption is not valid, then the Theorem's
implication that the initial allocation of rights is irrelevant will also be invalid.
142. See POLINSKY, supra note 14, at 145.
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should be nonpositive. Both observations suggest-but do not prove-that
uncertainty generates a proplaintiff bias in the litigation process that, all other
factors equal, provides an incentive for plaintiffs to file a greater-than-optimal
number of lawsuits which can generate a greater-than-optimal value of
settlements, where optimality is measured relative to the lawsuit's expected or
terminal value. We emphasize that this observation, even if correct, is rooted in
a partial equilibrium calculus that relies on a set of strong ceteris paribus
assumptions.
C. Extensions
The binomial two-stage model presented in this Article is the simplest
possible real options model of the litigation process that incorporates
bargaining behavior. In order to provide greater insights, this model can be
extended in several significant directions. In particular, the model can be made
more general by substituting a continuous probability distribution for the
binomial, 143 and then by assuming a multiperiod litigation process in which
continuous probability distributions describe the information to be revealed at
each stage of the litigation. 144 In the limit, the multiperiod model describes a
continuous-time litigation process. 1
4 5
As presently structured, the model also considers only learning options that
are coupled with costless abandonment options. That constraint can be relaxed
to allow for costly abandonment, as well as to create options that would allow
litigants to increase, reduce, accelerate, or defer litigation expenditures. The
model can also be expanded to allow for options that increase or reduce the
magnitude of the expected judgment and the volatility inherent in each stage of
the process. The underlying stochastic process therefore need not be viewed as
stable or as exogenously determined throughout a lawsuit's evolution.
The model's assumption that the plaintiff controls all of a lawsuit's
optionality is unrealistic and can be relaxed. In practice, defendants file
counterclaims and exercise various other forms of optionality that can be
readily incorporated into our model. Our model can also be extended to
incorporate assumptions about divergent expectations and asymmetric
information, 146 differential risk aversion, 147 and emotional responses to
143. Grundfest, Huang & Wu, supra note 65, analyzes uniform and lognormal
probability distributions. Alexander Triantis also mentioned extensions of our model to
examples involving lognormal and normal probability distributions in his discussion of an
earlier version of this Article presented at the John M. Olin Conference on Real Options and
the Law, University of Virginia Law School (Oct. 1, 2004).
144. Triantis, supra note 143, also discussed extensions of our model to N periods. See
also Grundfest, Huang & Wu, supra note 65 (generalizing this model to multiple periods).
145. Grundfest, Huang & Wu, supra note 65 (analyzing a continuous-time model with
geometric Brownian motion).
146. For discussions concerning the effect of divergent expectations and asymmetric
information in litigation, see Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and
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litigation. 148 Extensions that incorporate divergent expectations in real options
models explain a common tendency for plaintiffs to initiate lawsuits that settle
at particular points during litigation short of trial.
149
Moreover, as previously observed, 150 the precise equilibrium values
generated by our model depend on the assumption that the plaintiff's claim
loses credibility if the expected value of the plaintiff continuing with litigation
is not positive, without giving regard to litigation expenses that would be
incurred by the defendant if the plaintiff continues to pursue his claims. An
alternative equilibrium concept might view plaintiffs as willing to engage in a
form of extortionist conduct. Plaintiffs might credibly threaten to continue with
NEV litigation provided that the costs imposed on defendants are greater than
the costs that would be borne by plaintiffs. In that event, plaintiffs with
sufficient bargaining power could extract settlements that include a portion of
the litigation costs that would be avoided by defendants as a consequence of
early settlement, even though the claim is not credible absent the threat
value. 151 Another equilibrium concept might recognize the possibility that
some plaintiffs gain pleasure from the simple fact that litigation imposes costs
on defendants, even if plaintiffs' costs exceed defendants. This form of
litigation schadenfreude might arise in divorce actions, child custody cases, and
other types of litigation that have high emotional components or that manifest
"grudges" held by plaintiffs against others.
As currently constructed, the model assumes that aggregate litigation
expenditures, the timing of those expenditures, expected judgments, and
anticipated volatilities are exogenously determined. In reality, however, the
litigation process can reflect complex strategic interactions as each party's
Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 16 J.L. & ECON. 451, 457-67 (1998)
(presenting empirical evidence finding the litigation process is consistent with divergent
expectations theories, but not asymmetric information models); Muhamet Yildiz, Waiting To
Persuade, 119 Q.J. ECON. 223 (2004) (providing a sequential bargaining model involving
players having differing optimistic beliefs about their bargaining power). See also Urs
Schweizer, Litigation and Settlement Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information, 56 REV.
ECON. STuD. 163 (1989); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Solution to the Problem of
Nuisance Suits: The Option To Have the Court Bar Settlement (Harvard Law & Econ.
Discussion Paper No. 489, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-623285 (last visited
Feb. 25, 2006).
147. For discussions of differential risk aversion's implications, see W. Kip Viscusi,
Product Liability Litigation with Risk Aversion, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 103 (1988); Jianjun
Miao & Neng Wang, Risk, Uncertainty, and Option Exercise (2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=605221 (last visited Feb. 25, 2006).
148. For a discussion of emotional reactions in litigation, see Peter H. Huang & Ho-
Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 31 (1992).
149. See Appendix Proposition 14; see also supra note 44.
150. See supra Part III.C.4.
151. See, e.g., Huang & Wu, supra note 148 (analyzing such emotions as anger and
vengeance in litigation); see also William G. Morrison, Instincts as Reflex Choice: Does
Loss of Temper Have Strategic Value?, 31 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 335 (1996) (explaining
how loss of temper can create such a threat value to bolster credibility of the litigation).
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strategy can depend critically on assumptions regarding opposing parties'
conduct. A complete model of the litigation process would therefore include a
game-theoretic component that incorporates strategic interaction effects
throughout the litigation process, including, for example, in the determination
of the amount and sequence of litigation expenditures and in the use of
strategies that are likely to increase or dampen the volatility and expected value
of litigation outcomes.
152
In addition to rich opportunities for technical extensions of the model, the
real options approach is also potentially well suited to the study of specific
policy issues related to the operation of the litigation process. The debates over
class action litigation and fee shifting are examples of two public policy issues
that are particularly susceptible of analysis through the lens of real option
theory.
As for the study of class action litigation, Judge Posner's decision in
Rhone-Poulenc153 addresses a situation in which defendants might rationally be
willing to try a large number of lawsuits if each is prosecuted on an individual
case-by-case basis, but recoil at the prospect of trying the same set of cases if
aggregated as a class action claim. In Rhone-Poulenc, plaintiff hemophiliacs
alleged that they had contracted Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) from
negligently manufactured blood clotting factors. Defendants had prevailed in
twelve of thirteen individual actions. The question on appeal was whether to
grant class certification. The court observed that for the remaining 300
individual actions, given the defendants' record of trial victories, the defendants
might lose about 25 individual suits with average damages of $5 million per
defeat, yielding a total liability of $125 million. However, if a class was
certified, Judge Posner projected that the number of claims would then increase
to potentially 5000 with a worst-case liability scenario of $25 billion-more
than enough liability to induce bankruptcy risk. As the court observed, the
defendants "may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will
be under intense pressure to settle." 154 This observation has spawned the
"settlement pressure" hypothesis, 155 which has been cited with approval in
some recent decisions as a factor militating against certifying large class
actions156 while being distinguished as irrelevant by other courts certifying
152. For an example of such strategic considerations incorporated into non-options
models of the litigation process, see Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement Bargaining and the Design
of Damage Awards, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 84 (1994). See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET
AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994) (providing several such examples). For an example
of real options models that incorporate strategic interaction effects, see GRENADIER, supra
note 1.
153. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
154. Id. at 1298.
155. See Charles Silver, We're Scared to Death: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1357 (2003).
156. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing
the risk of "all-or-nothing" verdicts).
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plaintiff classes. 157 The settlement pressure hypothesis has also generated a
split among academic commentators: some express concern over the "legalized
blackmail" of low probability class action lawsuits, 158 while others suggest that
courts applying the settlement pressure argument have relied on questionable
empirical assumptions and have been inconsistent in applying their logic to the
evaluation of class certification claims. 
159
Real option theory offers a rigorous tool for addressing this debate because
it allows for the straightforward comparison of the settlement value of a group
of cases if pursued on a case-by-case basis and the settlement value of the same
cases if aggregated into a single class claim. The comparison can account for
the fact that class certification simultaneously increases the variance of the
underlying claim and reduces the average cost of prosecuting and defending
each claim, and can eliminate the risk of inconsistent assumptions. Simple
examination of the model presented in this Article suggests that the variance-
increasing effect of claim aggregation can generate settlement pressure of the
form hypothesized in Rhone-Poulenc even if the defendants are risk-neutral and
not subject to bankruptcy risk. The real options model can also express that
pressure in the form of a ratio that describes the real option settlement value of
the aggregated class claim as percentage of the real option settlement value of
the same cases if pursued as individual claims. Whether the existence or
magnitude of such settlement pressure should influence the class certification
decision is an entirely distinct question, but real option theory can, we think,
help frame this debate with far greater precision.
The fee-shifting debate has also generated a large and contentious
literature 160 to which real option theory might be able to make a meaningful
contribution. The move from a regime in which each litigant bears his own
157. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d
Cir. 2001) ("While the sheer size of the class ... may enhance [plaintiffs' leverage in
settlement negotiations], this alone cannot defeat an otherwise proper certification.").
158. See, e.g., George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort
Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STuD. 521 (1997) (arguing that preaggregation substantive
review is necessary to prevent meritless cases which settle solely due to the presence of a
large class); Georgene M. Vairo, Georgine, the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the
Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 79 (1997) (tracing the
history of rhetoric behind the justifications for class aggregation and finding that closer
scrutiny to the fairness of aggregation and settlement values is needed).
159. See, e.g., Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail"
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1379
(2000) (concluding that the "risks of sweetheart and blackmail settlements have been
overstated" and that courts should not reduce access to the damage class action); Warren F.
Schwartz, Long Shot Class Actions: Toward a Normative Theory of Legal Uncertainty, 8
LEGAL THEORY 297, 297-98 (2002) (criticizing the characterization of long shot class actions
as "blackmail"); Silver, supra note 155, at 1357 (arguing that these "blackmail charges"
cannot survive scrutiny).
160. For a discussion of the effects of fee shifting on lawsuits, see SHAVELL, supra
note 25, at 428-32.
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expenses, the "American rule," to the "British Rule" in which the "loser"
(however defined) pays some fraction of the winner's litigation expenditures,
causes a simultaneous change in the variance and in the expected value of the
outcome of any lawsuit. Again, by comparing the option settlement values of
identical lawsuits with and without fee-shifting rules, it should be possible to
describe with precision the implications of changes in the rules governing the
allocation of litigation expenditures.
The real options approach also need not be limited to private civil litigation
seeking monetary damages. It is readily extended to address the criminal
process, as well as the several different forms of civil prosecutorial options held
by the Department of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and state enforcement agencies. Extensions to the
criminal process are, we believe, of particular interest in light of the extreme
penalties often imposed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Those extreme
sentences, when viewed through a real options model of the sort presented here,
create high variance that can dramatically increase the prosecution's bargaining
leverage, as has proven to be the case. 16 1 At the other end of the dispute
resolution spectrum, real option analysis can further be applied to the study of
arbitration, mediation, and other alternative dispute resolution techniques,
whether those techniques are applied as a prelude to litigation or as stand-alone
dispute resolution mechanisms.
At some point, however, it becomes useful to move beyond the
construction of abstract models of the litigation process and to apply real option
theory to the analysis of actual lawsuits. The challenge in this regard is similar
to the challenge observed as real option theory attempts to make the leap from
the academic environment to the corporate boardroom. There, practitioners
complain that it can be difficult to estimate the variance of the underlying
outcomes, that the number of decisions that have to be modeled can be very
large, and that the mathematics of solving for options values using formal
options methodology, such as the Black-Scholes options pricing model, 162 can
be quite daunting. 153 There are, however, straightforward responses to all of
these objections. These responses can be applied to help build real options
models of the litigation process and also suggest that constructing real options
models of the litigation process can in several respects be simpler than building
161. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004) (arguing that plea bargain sentences can be skewed by
uncertainty and statutory minimums and maximums for sentencing); Frank 0. Bowman, III,
Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History and Distressing Implications of the
Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments
that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373 (2004) (outlining impacts of increased maximum
sentences for economic crimes).
162. Fisher Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,
81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973).
163. See, e.g., Copeland & Tufano, supra note 56 (describing challenges of applying
real options theory and giving realistic techniques for responding to these challenges).
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real options models of other processes. 164 In particular, litigation is a highly
structured process and operates through a well-defined sequence of events.
Litigation is, in this respect, better defined than many other investment projects.
The likely range of outcomes at each stage of the litigation process is also
relatively well defined and is usually bounded in terms of a best and worst
possible outcome. Experienced counsel can generally provide reasoned
estimates of the distribution of these outcomes at each stage of the process.
165
Indeed, even if counsel lack the experience necessary to generate such
estimates, the models can be constructed using the equal ignorance assumption
and can be subjected to sensitivity analyses designed to test whether and how
various assumptions regarding the model's parameterization influence the
lawsuit's potential settlement value. Computationally, because lawsuits
typically involve a finite number of key decision points, standard binomial
lattice approaches to the valuation of real options will be particularly well
suited to the calculation of litigation options settlement values, and there will
likely be little reason to resort to more complex computational techniques,
166
such as the Black-Scholes option valuation model.
167
On the other side of the ledger, a lawsuit's settlement value can be
influenced by differential expectations, by differential bargaining power (or
perceptions of differential bargaining power), and by game-theoretic effects
that can be difficult to estimate. As difficult as these considerations are likely to
be, they will be no more difficult to address than the game-theoretic
considerations that arise in nonlitigation environments. 168 Further, if these
considerations are significant, they will have to be addressed in any model of
the litigation environment, whether expressed as a real options model or not.
From that perspective the problems encountered in implementing a real options
model of the litigation process are no easier or more difficult than the problems
that would be encountered in the application of other modeling techniques.
164. See, e.g., id. (describing realistic techniques for responding to the challenges of
applying real options theory). For an application of real option theory to real life valuation,
see Don M. Chance et al., Pricing an Option on a Non-Decreasing Asset Value: An
Application to Movie Revenue (unpublished manuscript, Dec. 16, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=870793.
165. See Victor, supra note 56 (explaining decision tree valuation of litigation).
166. See, e.g., Copeland & Tufano, supra note 56 (describing realistic techniques for
responding to the challenges of applying real options theory).
167. See Black & Scholes, supra note 162.
168. See Grenadier, supra note 1 (providing examples of complications in game
theory).
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APPENDIX: PROPOSITIONS AND PROOFS
PROPOSITION 1
(a) Necessary and sufficient conditions for credibility of litigation at the start of
Stage 2, prior to a court's disclosure of information, are: A > Cp2, or B > Cp2, or
both.
(b) A necessary and sufficient condition for credibility of litigation at the start
of Stage 1 is: S2 > Cpl, where S2 is the settlement value at the start of Stage 2.
(c) This lawsuit has an option settlement value measured prior to Stage 1
litigation costs of:
S* = {max (0, S2- Cp1) + (S 2 + Cdl)Inv[S 2 > C, 1]}, where Inv[S] is one if the
statement S is true and zero if S is false.
Proof.
At the start of Stage 2, before both parties learn a court's ruling and before a
plaintiff decides whether to spend Cp2, plaintiff's minimum demand is:
Min Demand 2 = p[max(0, A - Cp2)] + (1 - p)[max(0, B - Cp2)].
Notice that Min Demand2 involves expressions for payoffs of call options
written upon our underlying random variable X, with a strike price of Cp2.
Define Inversion bracket, Inv[S], to have value one if a statement S is true and
zero if a statement S is false.
Then, a defendant's maximum offer can be expressed as:
Max Offer2 = p(A + Cd2)Inv[A > Cp2] +(1 - p)(B + Cd)Inv[B > C,2].
Thus, assuming equal bargaining power, the settlement value at the start of
Stage 2 becomes:
S2 = '/2(Min Demand2 + Max Offer 2)
At the start of Stage 1, before a plaintiff decides whether to spend Cpj, this
lawsuit has a settlement value of:
S* = (Min Demand1 + Max Offer,), where
Min Demand, = max(0, S2 - CPO;
Max Offer, = (S 2 + Cdl)Inv[S2 > CP].
Notice that Min Demand, is an expression for the payoff of a call option
written upon the settlement value at the start of Stage 2, with a strike price of
Cp1.
Thus, from our above expressions for S2 and S*, it is clear that ifA > Cp2, or B
> C p2 , or both, and S2 > Cpl, this lawsuit is credible overall for this plaintiff in
the sense that S* > 0. Conversely, if S* > 0, then S2 > Cp, and either A > Cp2 ,
or B > Cp2, or both.
PROPOSITION 2
All PEV lawsuits are credible for every level of variance, i.e., for any values of
A and B.
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Proof"
A PEV lawsuit satisfies: V > Cp = Co1 + Co2 > Co2.
Suppose that A < Co2. Then we argue by contradiction that B > C 2 must hold.
For if both A < C , 2 and B < Co2, then pA < pC 2, (1 -p)B < (1 - p)Cp2, and so
g = pA + (1 - p)B < pCp2 + (1 - p)Cp2 = Co2, which contradicts I > Co2. Thus,
lawsuit credibility constraints at Stage 2 hold (i.e., both legs cannot be
noncredible). As for lawsuit credibility constraints at Stage 1 that S2 > C,,
suppose that both A > C 2 and B > Cp2 . Then,
S2 = [Min Demand 2 + Max Offer 2]
= 2[p(A - Co2) + (1 - p)(B - C 2) + p(A + Coo) + (1 - p)(B + Coo)]
= 2[2pA + 2(1 -p)B + C2- Co2]
= 1 + '/2 (Cd2 - Co 2 )
If S2 < C1, , then I + ( )(Co - Co2) < C1 , so that I + (Y)(Coo) < (/2 )Cp2 +
Cl, and I < pt + V2(Cd2) < Co1 + ( )Cp2 < Cp1 + Co2 = C, which
contradicts g > C1,.
Conversely, suppose that A > C 2, but B < C 2. Then, S2 = p[A + (Cd2 - C 2)].
We argue by contradiction that S2 > Cp1 must hold because S2 < C,1 €- p[A +
2(Cd2 Cp 2)] <Cp1 < pA < C 1l +(p/2)(Cp2 - Cd2). But now,
g pA + (1 - p)B
< pA + (1 - p)Cp2, because we assume B < Co2 < (1 - p)B < (1 - p)Cp2
< C , + (p/2)(Cp2 - Co) + (1 - p)Cp2, because we assumed pA < C1, +
(p/2)(Cp2 - Cdo)
<Cpl1 + (p/2)(Cp2) + (1 - p)C , 2, because (p/2)Cd2 > 0
< C , + (V)(p + 2 - 2p)(Cp2) = Cp1 + (Y2)(2 - p)(Cp2)
< Cl 1 + Cp2 = C, because (1/2)(2 -p) = 1 - (p/2) < 1.
But, g < C contradicts g > Cp.
PROPOSITION 3
Every NEV lawsuit is credible for a sufficiently high level of variance.
Proof"
An NEV lawsuit satisfies: p < C = C 1l + C 2. In order to be a credible lawsuit,
by Proposition 1, at the start of Stage 2, it must be that A > Cp2, or B > Cp2, or
both. If A < Co2, then we can ensure that B > Co2 must hold for a sufficiently
high level of variance by simply increasing B and simultaneously decreasing
A to preserve the value of p. Thus, the credibility constraints at Stage 2 hold
(i.e., both legs cannot be noncredible). As for the credibility constraint at
Stage 1 that S2> Cpl, note that as the variance increases, either A > Cp2 or B >
Cp2 fails to hold. Without any loss of generality, suppose that eventually A >
C 2, but B < Cp2. Then, S2 = p[A + (Coo - C1 2)]. To ensure this expression is
greater than Cpl, just increase A (and correspondingly, the variance).
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PROPOSITION 4
If A > 0 and B > 0, then some NEV lawsuits are never credible.
Proof"
Recall that a NEV lawsuit satisfies: p < CP = CP1 + C, 2 and that p = pA + (1 -
p)B. If we assume that Cp2 > g, a lawsuit is not credible when A = B = p (i.e.,
when the variance is zero). If both A > 0 and B > 0 and p and p are held fixed,
there is a maximum value that A can take on, namely pip (equivalently, when
B = 0). Consider NEV lawsuits with plaintiffs litigation costs in Stage 2
satisfying Cp2 > ip. Because p < 1, pIp > p. Therefore, if we assume that Cp2 >
pip > g, then for such NEV lawsuits, by construction, it is not credible for a
plaintiff to proceed with a lawsuit in Stage 2 for all values of A from 0 to p/p.
If both A > 0 and B > 0, then only these values are feasible for A. Thus, NEV
lawsuits with CP2 > p/p, A > 0, and B > 0 are never credible.
PROPOSITION 5
If no variance is associated with the underlying judgment, 6 9 meaning that A =
B = g, and if a lawsuit is credible, then the option settlement value of a lawsuit
equals its divisibility settlement value. 
170
Proof"
If A = B, then in Stage 2, a plaintiff's minimum demand,
Min Demand2 = max(0, A - Cp2) and the defendant's maximum offer,
Max Offer2 = (A + Cd2)Inv[A > Cp2].
Thus, the option settlement value at the start of Stage 2,
S2 = /2(Min Demand2 + Max Offer 2)
= 2[max(0, A - Cp2) + (A + Cd)Inv[A > Cp2]]
= 2[(A - Cp2) + (A + C,2)] because we assumed this lawsuit is credible,
meaning that A > Cp2
= I + 2 (Cd - Cp 2), because A = Bp.
From Proposition 1, option settlement value of a lawsuit is equal to:
S* = [max (0, S2- Cp) + (S2+ CdlInv[S2 > Cp1].
At Stage 1, by assumption, S2 > Cp (credibility of lawsuit); so that
S* = '/2[(S2 Cpl) + (S 2 + Cdl)]
= 1/2[(2S 2 + Cdl - Cpl]
= S2 -+ V2(Cdl Cpl)
= g + '/2 (Cd2 Cp2) + 2(Cd - Cp)
= p + V2(Cd - Cp), the divisibility settlement value.
169. To say variance of uncertainty that a court resolves is zero means a court's ruling
reveals no payoff-relevant information.
170. This demonstrates that Bebchuk's model with divisible litigation costs is a special
case of our model where variance is zero.
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PROPOSITION 6
For a credible lawsuit, if A > Cp2 and B > Cp2 (i.e., if the lawsuit is credible in
Stage 2 under either court ruling), then the lawsuit's option settlement value
equals its divisibility settlement value.
Proof:
If both A > C,2 and B > Cp2, then
S2 = '/2[Min Demand2 + Max Offer2]
'= [p(A - Cp2) + (1 - p)(B - Cp2) + p(A + Cd2) + (1 - p)(B + Cd2)]
g p + /2(Cd2- Cp2).
At Stage 1, by assumption, S2 > C, 1 (credibility of lawsuit); so that
S* = [(S2- Cpl) + (S2 + Cd)]
= S2 + Y2(Cdl - Cp)
= [ + (Cd2- C, 2) + '/2(Cdl - Cp.)
- p + 2(Cd - Cp), the divisibility settlement value.
PROPOSITION 7
If outcomes A and B are both nonnegative and Cd2 _> Cp2 , then a lawsuit's
divisibility settlement value is an upper bound for its option settlement value.
Proof"
Suppose that A > Cp2, but B < C, 2. Then,
S2 = 
1 [Min Demand2 + Max Offer 2]
= 1/2[p(A - Cp2) + p(A + Cd2)]
= p[A + (Cd2- Cp2)]
At Stage 1, if S2 > Cpl (credibility of lawsuit), then
S* = /2[(S2- Cpl) + (S2 + Cdl)]
= -/2[(252+ Cd1 - Cpr]
= S2 + 2(C1 - Cp)
= pA + (p/2)(Cd2 - Cp2) + (Cdl - Cpl), which differs from a lawsuit's
divisibility settlement value, V + 2(Cd - Cp), by (1 - p)[B + (/2)(C2 -
PROPOSITION 8
For a credible lawsuit, if A > Cp2 and B > Cp2 and Cd = Cp, then t (the initial
expected value of its judgment) equals its divisibility settlement and its option
settlement value.
Proof:
A credible lawsuit's divisibility settlement value is P + (/2)(Cd - Cp). So, if Cd
= Cp, then its divisibility settlement value equals [t. If A > Cp2 and B > C, 2,
then proposition 6 ensures that its divisibility settlement equals its option
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settlement value.
Note that if X denotes a random variable that can take on values of either A or
B, then Var(X) = g 2 = E[(X - P)2] = E[X 2 - 2pX + I2] = E[X2] - 2IE[X] +
E[g 2] = E[X 2] _ 2I2 +  2 = E[X 2] _ I 2= pA2 + (1 - p)B -22 = pA 2_ 2+ ( _
pA)B, because (1 - p) B = [ - pA from p = pA + (1 - p)B. Thus, Var(X)
pA 2 - I2 + [(g _ pA) 2]/(1 - p), because B = (p - pA)/(l - p). This
2demonstrates that Var(X) = a is a function of A (or B because of our mean-
preserving spread condition). Var(X) is a monotonically increasing function of
A because the partial derivative of Var(X) with respect to A is nonnegative. In
symbols, aVar(X)/aA = 2pA + [-2pit + 2p2A]/(1 - p) = 2p[A - (g - pA)/(l -
p)] = 2p[A(1 - p) - (g - pA)]/[(1 - p)] = 2p[A - pt]/[(1 - p)] > 0 because, by
assumption, A > B, which means that A > p.
PROPOSITION 9
As A increases from g, where the option settlement value coincides with the
divisibility settlement value, there exists a value of A at which the lawsuit's
option settlement value differs from its divisibility settlement value. If a lawsuit
is not credible at Stage 1, then its option settlement value is constant at zero
until A is large enough for the lawsuit to become credible for a plaintiff at
Stage 1. Once a lawsuit is credible at Stage 1, its option settlement value is a
monotonically increasing affine function of A. This affine function has a value
which is initially less than this lawsuit's divisibility settlement value if that
divisibility settlement value is positive, but at some value of A, this affine
function equals this lawsuit's divisibility settlement value, and for all values of
A larger than this critical point, this function exceeds the lawsuit's divisibility
settlement value. A discontinuity in this lawsuit's option settlement value
occurs when A is sufficiently large.
Proof:
This proposition derives comparative statics for a lawsuit's option settlement
value as a function of A (or B or Var(X) = a2). Graphically, this proposition
involves plotting S* against A. Draw a diagram that has A = B = P as its
origin with S* = P + ' (Cd - Cp). As A increases, S* remains at pt + '/2(Cd -
Cp), until A = (1/p)[p - (1 - p)Cp2] (4= B = Cp2). At which point, if a court
selects B, a plaintiff will abandon the lawsuit. If a court selects A, a plaintiff
will have a credible threat to proceed at Stage 2 ifA > Cp2 (.t* 9 > Cp2). If not,
a plaintiff would not file a lawsuit because S2 = 0. If a plaintiff has a credible
threat to proceed at Stage 2, then S2 = p[A + (C,2 - C,2)]. A plaintiff at Stage
1 only proceeds if doing so is credible, i.e., S2 > Cp, (*ip + [(p/2) - 1]Cp2 +
(p/2)Cd2 > Cp,). If not, a plaintiff would not file the lawsuit because S* = 0. If
S2 > Cor, then S* = pA + (p/2)(Cd2 - Cp2) + (Cdl - Cp,). Thus, S* drops
discontinuously to
S* = [pA + (p/2)(Cd2- Cp2) + ' (Cdl - Cpl)]Inv[A > Cp2] Inv[p[A + '/2(Cd2
- Cp2)] > Cpl ] .
For large enough values of A, S2 = p[A + (Cd - Cp2)] will exceed Cpl, so that
it will be credible for a plaintiff to proceed at Stage 1.
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A discontinuity in S* occurs at A = max{(1/p)[p - (1 - p)Cp2], Cp2, (1Ip)Cp
(Cd2 - Cp 2 )}.
PROPOSITION 10
For a range of A values for which a lawsuit's option settlement values are
increasing (i.e., over its affine range), plaintiffs will act as if they are risk-
seeking and defendants will act as though they are risk-averse, although both
are risk-neutral.
Proof"
For values of A which S2 = p[A + (Cd2- Cp2)] > Cpl, and A > Cp2,
S* = [pA + (p/2)(Cd2- Cp2) + (Cdl - Cp 1)].
This is an increasing function of A, as are both a plaintiff s minimum demands
and defendant's maximum offers at both stages. In this sense, plaintiffs will
act as if they are risk-seeking and defendants will act as though they are risk-
averse.
PROPOSITION 11
As a plaintiffs litigation costs decrease (increase), ceteris paribus, all of the
following increase (decrease):
(a) a lawsuit's option settlement value;
(b) the difference between a lawsuit's divisibility settlement value and its
option settlement value after its point of discontinuity;
(c) a lawsuit's point of discontinuity of option settlement value as a function
of A.
Proof"
A lawsuit's divisibility settlement value is 9i + /2(Cd - Cp). A lawsuit's option
settlement value when it differs from this and is not zero is S* = [pA +
(p/2)(Cd2 - Cp2) + '/2(Cdl - Cpl)].
(a) This expression increases as a plaintiffs litigation costs decreases,
ceteris paribus.
(b) The difference between a lawsuit's divisibility settlement value and a
lawsuit's option settlement value after its discontinuity is the absolute
value of (1 - p)B + [(1 - p)/2](Cd2 - Cp2). This expression also increases
as a plaintiff's litigation costs decreases, ceteris paribus.
(c) Finally, the discontinuity in S* as a function of A occurs at
max{(l/p)[ .i - (1 - p)Cp2], Cp2, (1/p)Cp - (C2- Cp2)}, which also
increases as a plaintiff s litigation cost decreases, ceteris paribus.
PROPOSITION 12
As Stage 1 litigation costs increase relative to Stage 2 litigation costs, if total
litigation costs and all other variables are held fixed,
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(a) there is a larger interval of A values over which a lawsuit's option
settlement value coincides with a lawsuit's divisibility settlement value;
(b) a plaintiff is more likely to have a credible threat to proceed at Stage 2;
(c) a plaintiff is less likely to have a credible threat to proceed at Stage 1;
(d) there is a smaller range of A values over which a lawsuit's option
settlement value is a monotonically increasing affine function.
Proof-
As Cp, increases, Cp2 decreases (to keep total plaintiff litigation costs C,
constant), and as Cdl increases, Cd decreases (to keep total defendant litigation
costs Cd constant). This entails that:
(a) A reaches the critical point A = max{(1/p)[gt - (1 - p)Cpd2 , C 2,
(1/p)Cp - ' (Cd2 - Cp2)} at higher values;
(b) Stage 2 credibility constraint A > C, 2 is more likely to hold;
(c) Stage 1 credibility constraint S 2 = p[A + (Cd - Cp2)] > Cp, is less
likely to hold: C decreases as Cd1 increases and for any increase A in
Cp, the left-hand term of the inequality will only increase by ApA < A;
(d) the minimum value of A for which S2 = p[A + A(Cd2 - Cp2)] > Cp,,
namely A = (1/p)Cpl + [Cp2/2] - [Cdj2] increases because (1/p) > I as p <
1.
Therefore, the increase in Cpl trumps the decrease in Cp2 and the increase in
Cd1 means a decrease in Cd2, which is being subtracted.
PROPOSITION 13
As a plaintiffs bargaining power increases, more NEV lawsuits are credible,
option settlement values increase, and the effect of the increase in a plaintiffs
bargaining power is more than proportional when a lawsuit is NEV or a
plaintiffs litigation cost in Stage 1 is sufficiently large.'
71
Proof-
If parties differ in their bargaining strength, suppose that at each stage, a
plaintiff makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability a and a defendant
makes the take-it-or-leave-it offer with probability 1 - a. Because an ability to
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer conveys a bargaining advantage, ct > 2 means
that a plaintiff has greater bargaining power and a < / means that a defendant
has greater bargaining power (and a = 2 means a plaintiff and defendant have
equal bargaining power). When a plaintiff makes a settlement offer, he will
offer the highest amount that a defendant will be willing to accept and when a
defendant makes the settlement offer, he will offer the lowest amount that a
plaintiff will be willing to accept. Thus, at the start of Stage 2,
S2 = oc(Max Offer 2) + (1 - ct)(Min Demand2), where
171. An example illustrates what we mean by disproportionality in this context: a 10%
increase in a plaintiff's bargaining power can lead to a much larger than 10% increase in a
lawsuit's option settlement value because that increase can create lawsuit credibility where
there otherwise would be none.
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Max Offer 2 = p(A + Cd2)lnv[A > C,2 ]+( - p)(B + Cd2)Inv[B > Co2]
Min Demand2 = p[max(0, A - Cp2)] +(1 - p)[max(0, B - Cp2)].
Similarly at the start of Stage 1,
S* = cx(Max Offer,) + (1 - (x)(Min Demand,), where
Max Offer, = (S2+ Cd,)Inv[S2> Cp]
Min Demand, = max(0, S2- CPr)
Suppose that both A > Co2 and B > Cp2 . Then,
S2 = (Max Offer 2) + (1 - a)(Min Demand 2)
= c[p(A + Cd2) + (1 - p)(B + Cd2)] + (1 - (x)[p(A - Cp2)+(1 - p)(B - CP2)]
= t + ccCd2 - ( - aX)Cp 2.
Thus, the Stage 1 credibility condition S2 > Cpl is more likely to be satisfied as
ct increases.
Suppose that A > Cp2, but B < C,2. Then,
S2 = oc(Max Offer,) + (1 - o)(Min Demand,)
= x [p(A + C2)] + (1 - a)I[p(A - Cp2)]
= p[A + aCo2- (1 - 0xCp2)].
Again, the Stage 1 credibility condition S2 > Cp is more likely to be satisfied
as x increases.
If both A > Cp2 and B > C, 2, recall from the above that this implies S2 = 9 +
cCd2 - (1 - ox)Cp2, and so
S* = 9 + OCCd2- (1 - )Cp2 + cLCdl -(1 - 0)CplI
= P + 0CCd- (I - )Cp.
This expression increases as cx increases.
If A > Cp2, but B < Cp2, recall from the above that this implies S2 = p[A + aC
- (1 - a)Cp2)], and so
S* = p[A + (xCd2- (1 - (x)Cp2)] + XCdl- (1 - Ox)Cpl.
Again, this expression increases as a increases.
If A = B = p, by Proposition 6, a lawsuit's option settlement value coincides
with its divisibility settlement value, namely p. + cxCd (1 - C)Cp, an
expression that increases as (x increases.
Finally, the question of whether the effect of an increase in the plaintiffs
bargaining strength on the option settlement value can be more than
proportional is equivalent to asking if the elasticity of the option settlement
value with respect to the plaintiff's bargaining strength is greater than one, or
(aS*/(D)(uJ1S*) > 1.
Notice that if both A > C,2 and B > Cp2 (or A = B = pi) , then
aS*/cxC = Cd+ Co, so that
(aS*/acx)(cLS*) c .(Cd+ Cp)/S* = c(Cd+ Cp)/[Ig + C.Cd- (1 - cX)Cp]
(aS*/aa)((/S*) > 1 if Cp > g., i.e., the lawsuit is NEV.
If A > C, 2, but B < Cp2, then
aS*/cx = p(Cd + Cp2) + Cd + Cp,, so that
(aS*/aa)(aS*) -= oX[p(Cd2 + Cp 2) + Cdl + Cpl]/ p[A + xCd2- (1 - a)Cp2)] +
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OCCdl - (I - at)CP1
(aS*/ac)(O/S*) > 1 ifpCp2 + Cpl > pA.
But, as we assumed that A > Cp2, pA > pCp2, so that pCp2 + Cp1 > pA can only
hold if C, is sufficiently large.
PROPOSITION 14
If litigants have heterogeneous beliefs over variance of the judgment, even
though they agree over an initial expected value of the judgment, then litigation
may not settle immediately, but instead may settle mid-stream.
Proof.
Consider the following parameter values: p = Y2, C,1 = Cd1 = 10, Cp2 = C2 =
80, g = 100; then, C, = Cd = 90. Suppose that a plaintiff believes that Ap = 260
(and so believes that BP = -60), and a defendant believes that Ad = 100 (and so
believes that Bd = 100). A plaintiff believes that Sp* = Sp2 = 130. A defendant
believes that Sd* = Sd2 = 100. Because S,* > Sd*, parties do not settle initially.
But, a plaintiff initially believes that by spending Cpl = 10, it will be able to
learn a court's announcement of A = 260 (and B - -60) and receive a
settlement of S2 =130. Similarly, a defendant initially believes that by
spending Cdl = 10, it will be able to learn a court's announcement of A = 100
(and B = 100) and have only to make a settlement of S2 =100. So, both parties
initially proceed to spend Cp = CdI. Once a court announces its variance, both
parties know it and proceed to settle for a corresponding value of S2. Ex post,
one party is wrong and has spent Cp, = CdI = 10 for naught, because that party
ends up with an option settlement value which another party had expected. Ex
post, one party is right and even after spending Cpl = Cdl = 10, that party is
better off than it would have been had it agreed to settle initially for an option
settlement value that another party had expected.
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